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MILITARY AFFAIRS

No. 1730

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No. 7, July 1982

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TRENDS IN SOVIET MILITARY ORGANIZATION DEVELOPMENT REVIEWED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 7, Jul 82 (signed to press 23 Jun 82) pp 3-9

[Article by Professor and Doctor of Historical Sciences, Lt Gen Ye. Nikitin and Professor and Doctor of Historical Sciences Capt 1st Rank N. Minayev: "The Basic Trends of Soviet Military Organizational Development in Light of the Historical Experience of the CPSU"]

[Text] The 26th CPSU Congress, having set the basic areas of domestic and foreign policy for the state and having outlined an all-encompassing specific program for the nation's economic and social development for 1981-1985 and up to 1990, reaffirmed the Leninist peace-loving foreign policy and set out a broad realistic program aimed at strengthening peace, deepening detente, checking the arms race and preventing a new world war. **"To defend peace,"** said the Secretary General of the CPSU Central Committee, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, at the 26th CPSU Congress, **"at present, there is no more important task on the international level for our party, our people and indeed for all the peoples of the world."**¹

CPSU foreign policy is aimed at ensuring favorable international conditions for building communism in the USSR, at defending the state interests of the Soviet Union, at strengthening the positions of world socialism, at supporting the struggle of peoples for national liberation and social progress, at preventing aggressive wars, at achieving universal and complete disarmament and at carrying out the principle of peaceful coexistence among states with different social systems.

In approaching the significant date of the 60th anniversary of the formation of the USSR, the Soviet people are achieving new successes in all areas of communist construction, and by their unstinting labor are contributing in every possible way to the further strengthening of the socialist fatherland's defense might.

In consistently carrying out a peace-loving foreign policy, the CPSU and the Soviet government have constantly followed the legacy of V. I. Lenin: "The person who forgets the danger constantly threatening us and which will not end as long as world imperialism exists, the person who forgets this forgets our worker republic."²

In analyzing the international situation, the 26th CPSU Congress pointed out that in recent years, the aggressiveness of imperialism, and primarily American, has increased sharply. "Adventurism and a readiness to wager the vital interests of mankind for the sake of its own narrow selfish goals," said Comrade L. I. Brezhnev at the congress, "this is what is particularly apparent in the policy of the most aggressive imperialist circles."³ For this reason, the party and government constantly keep the questions of strengthening the defense capability of the nation and its Armed Forces at the center of their attention.

In acting as the leading and directing force of Soviet society and in relying on Marxism-Leninism and its methodological principles, the CPSU has outlined the general prospects of military organizational development, it has directed the efforts of the people at improving the economic, sociopolitical and spiritual bases of national defense capability and has given a planned and scientifically sound character to the development of the Army and Navy.⁴

The more than 60-year experience of our nation and its revolutionary practices show that the defense of socialism is an objective pattern in its development and strengthening. This stems from the contradictoriness of the class interests in the two socioeconomic systems as well as from the aggressive nature of imperialism.

Recent events again and again confirm that our class opponents are acting against the socialist nations with ever-greater refinement and perfidiousness. This was the case in fraternal Poland where a threat arose to the very foundations of the socialist state and upon a decision of the nation's highest body and in full accord with the Polish Constitution, a state of martial law was introduced. This decision was dictated by the extreme necessity of preventing bloodshed and a civil war, defending the vital interests of the Polish nation and protecting socialism in Poland.

Under the conditions of the growing aggressiveness of imperialism, the party and state, the 26th CPSU Congress pointed out, have not for an instant overlooked the questions of **strengthening the defense might of the nation and its Armed Forces**. High praise was given the Soviet Army and Navy from the congress rostrum. A strong fusion of high technical equipping, military skill and unshakable morale--this is the combat potential of the Soviet Armed Forces. This expresses not only their present state, but also the historical experience gained by the party in military organizational development and this determines the main paths of its further development and improvement.

In his report at the May (1982) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev reemphasized that, in continuing the constant and purposeful struggle for a lessening of international tension, "we will maintain the nation's defense capability on the necessary level."⁵

In carrying out the task of defending socialism, creating and developing the combat potential of the Soviet Armed Forces and in increasing their combat readiness, the Communist Party has proceeded and does proceed from the fundamental instructions of V. I. Lenin on the need for an organic unity of political, economic and military leadership. The development of our army, V. I. Lenin pointed out, should be carried out in a spirit of general Soviet development.

The development of the **technical equipping of the Soviet Armed Forces** has been determined by the new socialist system and by the rapidly developing economy, science, technology and culture, by the moral-political unity of the entire Soviet society. The party has seen the way to strengthening economic and military might primarily in the accelerated development of heavy industry, in a fundamental transformation of agriculture and in a cultural revolution. The international situation does not make it possible to defer or greatly draw out the carrying out of these tasks. At any moment the imperialists could attack our nation benefiting from its technical and economic weakness. The question is posed thusly: either the Soviet people will create a heavy industry and strong defense industry in the shortest period of time or the Soviet nation, in being in a situation of a besieged fortress, will be crushed by a new imperialist intervention.

The concentrating of the nation's political, economic and military efforts has made it possible for the party in a short period of time to fundamentally solve the problem of developing the state's military-economic potential, to create the necessary conditions for strengthening its defense capability, for technically reequipping the Army and Navy and to establish the bases for the victory won by our people in the Great Patriotic War.

The party has elaborated the economic strategy and program of social changes on a basis of the organic unification of scientific and technical achievements with the advantages of developed socialism. Their implementation also ensures the strengthening of the nation's defense capability.

At the given stage of its development, as was pointed out in the Decree of the CPSU Central Committee "On the 60th Anniversary of the Formation of the USSR," the USSR is a mighty industrial power with highly mechanized agriculture, progressive science and culture and its share in world industrial production has risen from 1 percent in 1922 to 20 percent at present. The economy of each Union republic presently holds an important place in the social division of labor. The republics are making an ever-weightier contribution to further increasing the material and spiritual potential of the motherland and strengthening its defense might.

At present, our Armed Forces in terms of their technical equipping and organizational structure, control and support system significantly exceed the level which they had by the end of the Great Patriotic War. They are organized considering the last achievements of scientific and technical progress. The development level of the economy, science and technology under present-day conditions makes it possible, relatively quickly, to develop modern types of weapons and military equipment which, in being received by the troops, objectively necessitate changes and development in the existing forms and methods of armed combat.

The Army and Navy have at their disposal modern nuclear missile weapons, supersonic missile-carrying aviation, nuclear missile submarines and missile surface vessels, radioelectronic and other modern military equipment. The further economic and social development of the nation, the great prospects of which have been outlined by the 26th CPSU Congress, will make it possible in the future to maintain the technical equipping of the Soviet Armed Forces on the proper level.

Our party has constantly emphasized that, in strengthening the Armed Forces, we have never sought and will not seek military superiority, we threaten no one and are not imposing our will on anyone. The essence of our military policy consists in effective national defense and there is nothing higher than this.

This is clearly expressed in the provisions of the USSR Constitution which outline the demands in the area of protecting the socialist fatherland. The Fundamental Law emphasizes that under the conditions of building communism, the defense of the fatherland is an objectively necessary concern of all the people. It is pointed out that ensuring the security and defense capability of the nation is one of the main tasks of a socialist state of all the people. It also establishes that the defense of the socialist fatherland is the sacred duty of each Soviet citizen and that military service in the ranks of the USSR Armed Forces is an honorable duty.

Thus, whatever period we might take from the history of our state, it shows that **the party and government have given constant attention to the technical strengthening of the Army and Navy and to the all-round building up of national defense.**

The 26th CPSU Congress has called **the military skill of the personnel** the second component in the combat potential of the Soviet Armed Forces.

In carrying out the task of training military personnel, the Communist Party has proceeded and does proceed from the ideas of the founders of Marxism-Leninism on the role of man and technology in war. In his works, the great expert in military affairs F. Engels pointed out that no army can achieve a victory over an enemy if it does not have at its disposal a sufficient quantity of weapons and if its personnel do not "know their firearms well."⁶ This pattern is expressed with great profundity in the view of V. I. Lenin that "the best army, the personnel most dedicated to the cause of the revolution will rapidly be routed by the enemy if they are not sufficiently armed, supplied with food and trained."⁷

These instructions underlay the party's practical activities in organizing the Red Army during the years of the Civil War and during the period of the prewar five-year plans.

With the outbreak of the Great Patriotic War the party initiated enormous work to organize the repelling of the enemy. One of the crucial conditions for the victory in the war against Nazi Germany was the ability of the CPSU and the Soviet state to ensure superiority over the enemy both in military-technical terms as well as in the training of the personnel and to employ the military equipment and weapons with maximum effectiveness.

In the postwar years, the role of the Communist Party in directing military organizational development has grown significantly. This is due to the fact that at the present stage of history, the tasks of military organizational development have become significantly more complex and the range of economic, political, scientific and particularly military problems which the party must solve

in the interests of strengthening national defense capability has grown much wider.⁸

In a modern war, if imperialism succeeds in starting it, combat operations from the very first minutes will assume an extremely active nature. Their great dynamicness, intensity, decisiveness and the abrupt shifting from one type of combat operations to another greatly complicate the training and re-training of the personnel. Both the military equipment and weapons have also become more complex. This requires a high technical level from each soldier. It has become necessary to master a large amount of knowledge over a short time interval without lowering the combat capability of the subunits and units. As never before, great urgency has been assumed by the task of hitting the target with the first round, the first missile launch or the first air attack. This is possible only with excellent individual training of each man and high teamwork among the teams, crews, subunits and units. "The enormous destructive power of the new weapons, the complexity of their controls and the means of combating similar enemy weapons," pointed out the member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Minister of Defense, Mar D. F. Ustinov, "as well as the intense nature of modern combat operations on the ground, at sea and in the air require that the Soviet military possess excellent knowledge and skills in efficiently employing the individual and collective weapons under any complex situation. For this reason, the studying of the weapons and combat equipment as well as the methods of employing them in combat and an operation is one of the most important tasks in combat training and great attention is given to carrying it out."⁹

Unshakable troop morale is the third component of combat potential, as the 26th CPSU Congress pointed out.

The founders of Marxism-Leninism pointed to the enormous role of morale in military affairs and in the course and outcome of a war. V. I. Lenin has written: "In any war, victory is ultimately determined by the state of morale of those masses who shed their blood on the battlefield."¹⁰ This Leninist tenet expressing the essence of one of the basic laws of armed combat has been considered by the party in the course of the organizational development of the Red Army and it remains fully valid under present-day conditions.

The Armed Forces were created by the efforts of the CPSU to defend socialism. The Soviet Army is the beloved offspring of the party. It was born as the army of October and the defender of socialism. In the trenches of the Civil War, in the bold Chapayev attacks and in the night assaults against Spassk and Volochayevka, the world first saw the courage of the revolution's soldier, his moral beauty and his dedication to the interests of proletarians in all nations. Precisely then, in the fiery years of its birth, our army established the traditions which have become an enormous mobilizing force for all generations of defenders of the Soviet motherland.

In the prewar years, an unprecedented moral-political unity in society was established while the solidarity of the workers with the Communist Party and the Soviet government and friendship of peoples grew stronger. The changes which occurred in social life and the class structure of Soviet society significantly strengthened the military might of the USSR.

The Soviet people and their Armed Forces under the leadership of the Leninist party rose as a single person to defend the socialist fatherland and dealt crushing defeats to Nazi Germany and its satellites in the war. This war was the largest armed action by the assault forces of world imperialism against socialism and one of the severest hardships which our motherland has ever experienced. The entire world was amazed by the feats of the Soviet soldier. "Our victory," pointed out Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, "is a high point in the history of mankind. It has shown the greatness of our socialist motherland, it has demonstrated the omnipotence of communist ideas and has provided amazing examples of self-sacrifice and heroism...."11

In the postwar years, the importance of the moral-political and moral-psychological indoctrination of the men has increased. This has been due to the greater impact of modern warfare on the spiritual potential of the army. In the event that the enemy employs weapons of mass destruction, strength of spirit and will and the patriotic awareness of the personnel are particularly important. The logic of modern warfare demands that each serviceman be prepared ahead of time for severe testings.

These circumstances necessitate greater attention to developing in the personnel such moral-political qualities as responsibility, self-discipline and conscientiousness as well as to strengthening troop morale and improving their military-technical and special training. The tasks of indoctrinating all these qualities in the personnel were at the center of attention of the 6th All-Army Conference of Primary Party Organization Secretaries held in May of this year. In his report, the USSR Minister of Defense, Mar SU D. F. Ustinov, in particular, gave particularly important significance to the question of further strengthening military discipline. He emphasized that "military discipline is primarily a political and moral category. It is based upon the ideological conviction of the personnel and the spiritual maturity of the collective."11a

Under the conditions of developed socialism, the social base has grown wider for carrying out the tasks in the area of strengthening Soviet troop morale. Indoctrination on a basis of Marxist-Leninist ideology ensures the invincibility of our spiritual potential. Today's defenders of the socialist fatherland are young representatives of the workers, kolkhoz members and Soviet intelligentsia, they are strong in their communist conviction, collectivism, discipline and unshakable confidence in the justness of our cause and are ready to give up their lives for the sake of defending it.

In indoctrinating the Army and Navy personnel, an important role is given to the political bodies, the party and Komsomol organizations which through their influence encompass all spheres of life and activity of the men, they actively influence the personnel's awareness and heart, they unite them around the CPSU, they are the proponents of its ideas and mobilize the men to successfully carry out the pending tasks. The constant rise in the party's role in directing the Armed Forces is natural. The policy of the Communist Party in the area of military organizational development has brilliantly withstood the test of time.

A characteristic feature in the development of the Soviet Armed Forces at the present stage is the **further strengthening of their unity with the people.** Our Armed Forces have enormous affection and support from the Soviet people.

"The duty of the communists," states the Decree "On the 60th Anniversary of the Formation of the USSR," "is to constantly strengthen the unity and solidarity of the Soviet people, to indoctrinate in the workers a feeling of pride for the socialist fatherland and fraternal friendship among the Soviet peoples...." ¹²

The men of all nationalities stand military service in a single formation. In the units and on the ships the necessary conditions have been created for indoctrinating the servicemen in a spirit of socialist internationalism and the fraternal friendship of peoples. Joint military service brings the men of different nationalities closer together, it instills in them a feeling of military comradeship and contributes to ideological, spiritual and cultural mutual enrichment.

Our Armed Forces are the living embodiment of socialist internationalism. Shoulder to shoulder with their class brothers and comrades in arms, the Soviet military are carrying out their duty of defending the victories of socialism. Military skill is improved in close cooperation, the friendship of the internationalist soldiers grows stronger and is developed and the glorious military traditions born in the engagements against a common enemy are added to. The Soviet Armed Forces in the difficult international situation, when the aggressive NATO bloc is openly carrying out intense military preparations, are making their worthy contribution to strengthening the fraternal defensive alliance and maintaining the combat readiness of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact on a proper level. At the 26th CPSU Congress, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev said:
"...We will do everything so that this is the case in the future!" ¹³

There is one other particular feature of the internationalism in the Soviet Army and Navy. This is their solidarity with the working class, the workers of the capitalist and developing nations and with all the revolutionary forces of the modern world. The Soviet military, indoctrinated in a spirit of respect for the working man, in the event of imperialist aggression against our allied or other friendly countries, with courage, honesty and dignity will carry out their international duty at their request. A vivid example of this is the aid of the Soviet Union to the Afghan people in defending the victories of the April Revolution.

The unshakable morale and the high military skill of the Soviet servicemen were convincingly demonstrated in the course of exercises conducted in recent years. Particularly indicative in this regard were the "Zapad-81" [West-81] Exercises conducted on the territory of the Belorussian and Baltic military districts and in the Baltic Sea.

In the estimate of the USSR Minister of Defense, Mar SU D. F. Ustinov, during the exercises in a dynamic and complex situation as close as possible to actual combat, the troops and naval forces demonstrated high technical equipping, military skill and unshakable morale.

At the 17th USSR Trade Union Congress, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev said that our nation is firmly and steadily maintaining a policy of lasting peace and peaceful mutually-advantageous collaboration between all states, regardless of their social and political systems. In his address to the participants of the Second Special UN General Assembly Session, L. I. Brezhnev reemphasized that the dominant factor in Soviet policy is concern for peace. "...The highest duty of statesmen who are aware of their responsibility for the destiny of the world," pointed out Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, "is to make every effort so that nuclear weapons are never used."^{13a} But, "the militaristic course and aggressive policy of the NATO bloc headed by the United States force us to adopt measures to maintain the nation's defense capability on the proper level."¹⁴

In developing and strengthening the Armed Forces considering present-day requirements, the CPSU and its Central Committee headed by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev have made and are making a great contribution to the theory and practice of developing military affairs under the conditions of rapid scientific and technical progress. The enormous scope of the political, organizational and indoctrinational activities by the CPSU in the Army and Navy are proof of its growing leading role in the Armed Forces and a crucial factor in strengthening the motherland's defense capability.

FOOTNOTES

- 1 "Materialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 26th CPSU Congress], Moscow, Politizdat, 1981, p 31.
- 2 V. I. Lenin, PSS [Complete Collected Works], Vol 42, p 173.
- 3 "Materialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS," p 20.
- 4 "KPSS i voyennoye stroitel'stvo" [The CPSU and Military Organizational Development], Voenizdat, 1982, p 4.
- 5 PRAVDA, 25 May 1982.
- 6 K. Marx and F. Engels, "Soch." [Works], Vol 15, p 234.
- 7 V. I. Lenin, PSS, Vol 35, p 408.
- 8 See "KPSS i voyennoye stroitel'stvo," pp 19-20.
- 9 D. F. Ustinov, "Izbrannyye rechi i stat'i" [Selected Speeches and Articles], Moscow, Politizdat, 1979, p 502.
- 10 V. I. Lenin, PSS, Vol 41, p 121.
- 11 L. I. Brezhnev, "Aktual'nyye voprosy ideologicheskoy raboty KPSS" [Urgent Questions of CPSU Ideological Work], Vol 2, Moscow, Politizdat, 1978, p 491.

11a KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 12 May 1982.

12 PRAVDA, 21 February 1982.

13 "Materialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS," p 6.

13a PRAVDA, 16 June 1982.

14 PRAVDA, 17 March 1982.

15 "Materialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS," p 128.

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GORSHKOV ON DEVELOPMENT OF NAVAL ART OF WARFARE

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[Article, published under the heading "Soviet Art of Warfare in the Great Patriotic War," by Commander in Chief of the Navy - Deputy USSR Minister of Defense HSU Flt Adm SU S. Gorshkov: "The Development of the Naval Art of Warfare"]

[Text] By the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, Soviet naval art represented a harmonious system of views, on the basis of which the combat and operational training of the naval forces were organized and carried out, and measures were determined to assure the high readiness of the fleet.

In documents that regulated the combat activity of the Navy -- the 1937 Provisional Naval Combat Regulations (BUMS-37) and the 1940 Provisional Manual for the Conducting of Naval Operations (NMO-40) -- it was precisely pointed out that the navy must, in the event of war, support the ground forces in the coastal sectors and carry out independent operations at sea. In conformance with their purpose, the tasks posed, and the general principles of Soviet military art, the fleets prepared for aggressive, offensive actions in the open sea, in the air, and at the enemy's coastline, and for the active defense of friendly naval bases and fortified regions and the disruption of the enemy's naval communication lines.

During the 1930's our naval minds developed and created the theory of naval operational art. That theory contained the justifications and recommendations for the planning, preparation, and conducting of naval operations to destroy an enemy fleet at sea, and against bases and other important enemy objectives. Those minds developed with a large amount of completeness the operations on the enemy's naval communication lines, the operations intended to support friendly naval shipments, and other independent operations. A considerable amount of attention was given to operations conducted jointly with the ground forces: landing operations, operations launched against landings, and operations conducted for purposes of supporting their maritime flanks.

A typical feature of the prewar regulation documents was the fact that in them the preference was given to active forms of combat, to the striving to execute even the defensive tasks by means of decisive, offensive actions. They required the persistent search for and the bold attacking of the enemy under any conditions of the situation. As was pointed out in BUMS-37, "the constant striving to enter into

combat with the enemy for the purpose of defeating him must form the basis of the education and actions of every commander and fighting man in the naval forces of the RKKA [Workers and Peasants Red Army]. Without any special orders to this effect, the enemy must be boldly and decisively attacked wherever he is detected"¹.

On the eve of the war, the navy maintained high combat and mobilizational readiness. To no small degree that was promoted by the harmonious system that had been created and carried out under peacetime conditions for converting the forces to increased combat readiness, the organizing of naval reconnaissance, the patrol service, and all types of defense.

From the very first day of the war, all the fleets entered actively into the combat against the strong naval opponent, who was using the support of three air fleets and who, in addition, had at his disposal important strategic advantages which gave him the opportunity to launch a surprise attack. Their chief efforts were directed at the resolution of a very important task, which lay in providing support to the ground forces who were bearing the brunt of the country's defense against the enemy who had attacked and, in the final analysis, determined the outcome of the war. That is why actions that took on special scope were the joint actions of the army and navy in defense and during the course of offensive operations.

The Navy carried out support to the ground forces in defensive and offensive operations by the army groups by means of artillery and air support of their maritime flanks, by the landing of naval assaults, by supporting the operational regroupings of the forces and helping them to overcome water obstacles, and also by supporting the evacuation. An important role was played by the Navy in defending naval bases (VMB) and coastal areas. During certain offensive operations by the army groups on maritime sectors, the fleets carried out operations against the enemy's naval communication lines, destroying his transports with troops on board.

In the course of the war, various forms and methods were developed for organizing joint actions and for achieving their precise coordination on a strategic, operational, and tactical level. These were, first of all, the coordination of the actions performed by the army groups and fleets by representatives of the HQ Supreme High Command (SHC) and the People's Commissariat of the Navy; the joint elaboration, by army group and fleet headquarters, of the plans for operations; the precise organizations of control of the forces to be carried out from a single command post or from those situated in a row; the exchange of representatives among the headquarters of the various forces; the creation of a single command element when defending naval bases; the organizing and conducting of joint exercises and practice sessions during the period of preparation for operations; and the providing to the naval operations groups of means of communication and documents to support the combined actions.

In order to resolve the tasks to be executed jointly with the ground forces, the fleets carried out operations and conducted systematic actions which were usually component parts of army-group or strategic operations.

A scientific generalization of the experience that was accumulated in this regard was the development and publication in 1943 of the *Nastavleniye po sovместnym deystviyam sukhoputnykh voysk s Voyenno-Morskim Flotom i voyenno-rechnymi flotiliyami*.

[Manual for the Joint Actions of Ground Forces and the Navy and Naval River Flotillas], which were approved by the chiefs of the RKKA General Staff and the Main Naval Staff of the Navy.

In addition to the general principles of interaction, the manual set forth detailed recommendations for the conducting of assault actions. It defined, among other things: stages of the landing operation; principles of organizing the forces and the command element; requirements for reconnaissance and camouflage; measures to create favorable conditions at sea and on the land; recommendations for the concentration of troops, the grouping of them in waves, distribution by detachments, and the organizing of the landing (factors that were considered to be very important components in the success of launching the assault by sea were secrecy and the organizing of all types of defense); the duties and interrelationships of the landing commander, the assault commander, the landing-base commander, the landing-point commandant; etc.

A considerable place in this document was assigned to recommendations for supporting the army's flank by means of the fire from shipboard artillery, by providing cover for the troops against strikes from the sea, and by the disruption of the enemy's shore and front-line naval communications lines.

A special part was devoted to the joint actions between the ground forces and the river flotillas along the water line, and also when forcing and defending rivers, when landing river assaults, etc.

The recommendations in the manual became an important testimony to the creative development of the theory and bold generalization of the experience of combat actions.

The wartime experience indicated that when, in the conducting of complicated and multilevel work in organizing interactions, both sides showed an understanding of the need for coordinated, joint actions for the purpose of achieving the final goal in the operation, success was invariably achieved, whether it be in defense or in the offensive. That is attested to by the statements and authoritative remarks made by many prominent military leaders -- commanders of army groups and armies. However, it was, unfortunately, not always like that. There were also individual instances when there was a lack of understanding of the role and capabilities of the fleet; when units [*soyedineniye*] had tasks assigned to them that were beyond their ability or were not typical of them; the lack of understanding of the peculiarities of the organization and essence of interaction as a bilateral phenomenon that was based on the interdependence of the actions of all the types of forces and the fighting arms participating in the operation. In these instances there also were failures, unjustified losses, and sometimes even the nonfulfillment of the assigned task. However, there were not many of them. One need cite only one example -- the unsuccessful actions on the Crimean Front (Commander, General-Lieutenant D. T. Kozlov; representative of the HQ SHC, L. Z. Mekhlis) in 1942, which lost the Kerch' Peninsula largely because of the unskillful organization of interaction with the fleet during the defense of the lines being defended by the front, and the unskillful repelling of the advance by the German fascist troops. That led subsequently to the loss of Sevastopol' and to the destabilization of the situation in the southern sector of the Soviet-German Front. The potential capabilities that

appeared as a result of the first powerful counterattack from the sea, which was executed jointly by the fleet and the army, as a result of the unskillful actions that followed, and the disdain for the use of naval support, were not realized, and as a result one of the largest operations of the Crimean Front in 1941-1942, in the final analysis, suffered defeat.

A task that became a very important one in the joint actions of the army and navy from the very first days of the war was the defense of the naval bases. The complexity of that problem was explained to a considerable degree by the insufficient preparation for its resolution during the prewar years. Naval theory proceeded from the assumption that the strikes that represented the chief threat for the bases were those from the sea. Therefore the preparation of the fleets for the defense of the bases was carried out in conformity with specifically those assumptions. The responsibility for their defense from the land was given to the army command element of the army, which, in its turn, considered it to be relatively improbable that the enemy would succeed in creating a threat to the bases from the land. But the situation turned out differently in real life. A threat to the naval bases arose specifically from the land -- on the very first day of the war, for the Liyepaya [naval base] and Khanko, then for Tallinn and Murmansk with Polyarnyy, and soon for Odessa, Sevastopol', Novorossiysk, and others.

The only naval base that constituted an exception was Khanko, which, by virtue of its geographical situation, had promptly and carefully prepared for defense from all directions -- from the sea, the land, and the air. The lines for land defense were previously equipped here, and they were reliably covered by a system of artillery and machinegun fire; a single command element and precise organization of control were created; and the garrison troops and the naval forces practiced their interaction. The naval base had in the necessary combination units [*chast'*] and subunits [*podrazdeleniye*] of ground, naval, and air forces, supported by all the reserves required for approximately a half-year. All this made it possible to render the defense of Khanko inaccessible. That defense lasted for 5½ months and was discontinued only on the basis of an order from the SHC, ending with the garrison evacuation that was skillfully conducted by the Red Banner Baltic Fleet.

The situation proved to be different in the Liyepaya area, the defense of which from the land was not prepared ahead of time. The creation of a command element, the gathering of forces, and the organizing of their interaction, as well as the equipping of the positions, had to be carried out hurriedly under strikes by the enemy's superior ground and air forces. The initial lines for its defense were created only 5-6 kilometers from the port and the city. That gave the enemy the capability of effectively using artillery against the objectives being defended. Despite the massive heroism and bravery demonstrated by the defenders, the base was able to hold up for only five days. The experience of Liyepaya was taken into consideration when defending the chief base of the KBF [Red Banner Baltic Fleet], Tallinn, the outer lines of which were shifted 30-45 kilometers away from the city. That experience also served as a serious lesson for the Black Sea Fleet, which carried out the prolonged, 73-day defense of Odessa and the heroic defense of Sevastopol' -- a 250-day operation that was completely unprecedented from the point of view of bravery or the art of conducting it. The success of the defense of those bases was organizationally supported by the creation of a single command element, which in Odessa was made the responsibility of the commander of the naval base, and

in Sevastopol', the fleet commander. All the naval, land, and air forces that were assigned for their defense were united into a special formation -- the defensive region.

The defense of the major naval bases actually fused into the defensive operations that were characterized by their considerable scope. The operational structure of the forces in such an operation included a grouping of ground forces, including marines, the forces for the defense of the water region and the ship's artillery support of the troops, an air group, and also *chast'* of shore artillery and air-defense troops.

A factor of extremely great importance for the stability of the defense was the continuous functioning of naval communication lines, over which the defending forces were supplied with the necessary quantities of reserve replacements and all types of supply. An important role was played by artillery and air support of the defending forces, which support was carried out by naval forces which had been specially assigned, as well as by other forms of support to the troops, especially the landing of naval assaults that launched counterstrikes against the advancing enemy.

When organizing the defense of the naval bases, a considerable amount of importance was attached to the initiative of the naval command element. A good example is provided by the defense of Odessa and Sevastopol', especially the latter, where the military council of the Black Sea Fleet, even before the arrival of the German fascist troops, organized the defense of the main base from the land, and had begun to equip three defensive lines around the city. The enemy's first attacks at Sevastopol' were repelled by the naval garrison, with the participation of the fleet's vessels and aircraft before the arrival of the Maritime Army units.

At the same time, in certain instances there were also shortcomings. For example, during the organization of the defense of the Novorossiysk base, the proper initiative and aggressiveness were not shown on the part of the base leadership for the creation of the all-around defense of Novorossiysk, although there was sufficient time for that. The leadership felt that that task would be completely resolved by the ground command element, failed to evaluate the extent of the threat hanging over the city with the advance of the German troops, and failed to take into consideration the lessons learned in the defense of Liyepaya, Tallinn, and Khanko, Odessa, and Sevastopol'.

It was only the interference of the senior command element that made it possible to carry out hurried defensive measures, with the Novorossiysk naval base being the only executor of the decisions from the superior leadership.

It must be noted that the organizing of the defense of naval bases from the land was, for our fleet, a task that was not typical of it. However, we were able to resolve it successfully. In the course of joint actions to defend the bases and the maritime beachheads, Soviet military art achieved a high level of development in the organizing and conducting of such operations. Not a single other country had examples such as the defense of Khanko, Odessa, Sevastopol', and Novorossiysk. As a rule, the naval bases capitulated as soon as they were surrounded by land. For example, there is wide knowledge of the shameful capitulation of the British in Singapore at the very beginning of the war in the Pacific.

During the years of the Great Patriotic War, operations that became an extremely widely employed, and the most complicated and aggressive, form of joint actions of the army and navy were amphibious landings -- the crown of the art of joint offensive actions of the army and navy. It is not by accident that in the manual that has been mentioned the primary attention was devoted to questions of conducting landing actions.

At the same time it must be noted that during the prewar years the proper attention was not devoted to training for landings. We did not have any special landing craft, or landing means, or the necessary contingents of marines.

The art of landing actions received, during the years of the past war, especially great development of the following areas: the planning, preparation, and conducting of operations with a consideration of the strict coordination of the actions of the landings and the advancing troops in the army group; the organizing of landings of troops and equipment onto an unequipped coastline with the direct fire support on the part of the naval vessels and the aviation of the army group and fleet; the application of various methods for actions performed by tactical groupings -- the landing forces and troops to be landed; the organization of single administration of the forces in all links and at all stages of the operation; the organizing of party-political work; etc.

A variety of landing actions was the application of coastal convoy detachments (BOS), which were widely used in the river and lake theaters. Their makeup included vessels, marines, and sometimes also mobile artillery. The coastal convoy detachments supported the offensive actions of the ground troops that were operating in river sectors and provided cover for them during the forced crossing of water obstacles.

A differentiating feature of our landings was the short periods of time required to prepare them, as compared with those required in other combatant navies. During the first period of the war that was explained by the rapid changes in the situation, which hurriedly required a landing. During the subsequent periods, the amounts of time needed to prepare landings depended upon the plans and rates of the offensive operations in the maritime sectors. The tasks for the landing were assigned comparatively well in advance: for example, for the landing at Novorossiysk, 20 days in advance; in the Dnestr estuary, 14; in the area of the Tuloksa River, 10 days. It should be noted that the periods of time required to prepare the Anglo-American landings were measured in months, and the Normandy landing operation, in years.

The success rate of the amphibious landings, for all their brief preparation, was guaranteed by the high level of training in the marines and the rifle units that had been assigned to the assault, and also by the heroism of the participants; the high level of operational training of the staffs, the large amount of experience that was addumulated by the fleets, and the precise actions of all support links.

Exceptional attention was devoted to secrecy, which was achieved by effective measures of camouflage and by disinformation directed against the enemy. Suddenness of breakthrough in the defense against the assault and the landings frequently

was guaranteed by headlong actions without any preliminary artillery or air softening, and also by making landing directly at the moorings in the ports that were occupied by the enemy.

In the 1941 Kerch'-Feodosiya operation, a direct assault against the moorings in the port of Feodosiya was made by a cruiser, three destroyers, a minesweeper, and patrol boats. As a result a strike followed in a place that was most unexpected for the enemy. That method represents, without a doubt, the pinnacle of the art, boldness, skill, and precise computation.

It is important to know that measures to achieve surprise during an assault acquired special importance. They were developed in detail when planning every operation.

In generalized form these measures were developed each time on the basis of the conditions for carrying it out and they provided for camouflage, diversionary actions, the confusing of the enemy with regard to our intentions and plans, the secrecy of reconnaissance, and the establishment of the strictest regulations when using communication means.

Thus, during the course of the Great Patriotic War there was extensive development of the art of joint actions by the Soviet Army and Navy. Its ancient traditions, which had arisen as long ago as the civil war and the prewar years, were an important factor that assured success under the severe conditions of the struggle against German fascism.

In addition to the joint operations with the ground forces, the fleets throughout the war intensively waged combat actions against the enemy fleet. Those actions for the most part took the form of combat on the communication lines, in the course of which the Soviet fleets disrupted the enemy's naval shipments and defended our own communications. When these tasks were being resolved, there inevitably arose a conflict among various groupings of surface vessels, submarines, aviation, and sometimes even coastal artillery, as happened in the Northern and Red Banner Baltic Fleets. Our fleet directly opposed the strong naval enemy, who suffered considerable losses of combat vessels, auxiliary ships, and transports. As a result the fascists underreceived millions of tons of strategic raw materials that were extremely necessary to them, and lost a large quantity of troops, means for supplying them, and combat technology.

All this attests to the great strategic importance of the naval actions on the naval communication lines for victory over the enemy.

With the purpose of disrupting the enemy's naval communication lines, strikes were made against his transports and the forces for maintaining them at sea and in the ports of loading and unloading. In addition, mines were laid at junctures of lines of communications, and on the approaches to the enemy's ports and in narrow straits.

During the first period of the war our fleets resolved the task of disrupting the enemy's naval communication line by using the method of systematic actions. In 1941-1942 for this purpose use was made chiefly of submarines and torpedo boats,

since aviation and surface vessels were taken away to be used for joint actions with the ground forces.

Something that attracts attention is the experience in using submarines in the Baltic in 1942. A factor representing great complexity for them was the forcing of the antisubmarine lines in the Gulf of Finland, which lines were saturated with positional means and vessel forces. Therefore, when planning the successive breakthrough against the enemy's communication lines by several waves of submarines, the fleet headquarters stipulated the operational support of the forcing of the antisubmarine lines by actions of the surface vessels and aviation, which were given the responsibility for conducting reconnaissance and inflicting strikes at the enemy's antisubmarine forces at sea and the bases. However, the situation on the ground front did not always make it possible to use these supporting forces, and the submarines frequently proved to be forced to operate independently. Despite this fact, during the second half of 1942 three waves of submarines, albeit with losses, forced the Gulf of Finland and waged successful actions against the enemy's communication lines in the Baltic Sea².

As a result of the final transition in 1943 of the strategic initiative to the Soviet Armed Forces and the winning of mastery in the air, it became possible to involve in a much broader scale in actions against the enemy's lines of communications our naval aviation, which by that time had been provided with new aircraft. The basic means of combatting naval shipments continued to be the systematic actions of various naval forces. However, the leading role transferred firmly to naval aviation. It was precisely then that strikes began to be made more and frequently at convoys and ports by various aviation forces, and that increased their rate of results to a large degree.

With the beginning of the strategic offensive of the Soviet Army, and the surrounding on the seacoast of a number of groupings of enemy troops in 1944-1945, the role and importance of naval communications lines for the enemy considerably increased, and, at the same time, our fleets were presented with a broader and broader task of disrupting them. The successful resolution of this task by systematic actions alone would have been extremely difficult. Therefore the fleets changed over to a higher form of operational use of the forces -- the carrying out of naval operations on the enemy's communication lines.

The Black Sea Fleet in April-May 1944, in the course of liberating the Crimea, carried out an operation in which more than 400 aircraft of naval aviation, 13 submarines, and torpedo boats took part³. The interaction of the forces that were involved in the operation was of an operational nature. During the period of enemy evacuation, 102 ships of various kinds were sunk and more than 60 vessels and ships were damaged. According to data from the headquarters of the 17th German Army, the enemy losses constituted 42,000 soldiers and officers⁴.

Other actions that actually fused into this kind of operation were the actions of the forces of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet in the southern part of the sea in 1945, when the forces that were assigned to disrupting the enemy's naval communications lines, with his groupings that were pressed up against the sea, were 571 aircraft, 16 submarines, and a brigade of torpedo boats⁵. When strikes were being made at the ports of Memel', Liyepaya, Pillau, Kenigsberg, Danzig, etc., from where the

Germans were evacuating their troops, the aircraft of army-group and long-range aviation participated simultaneously with the air forces of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet.

Submarines and torpedo boats attacked enemy convoys at sea on the approaches to the ports that were mentioned. It is well known that, as a result of the combat actions of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, the enemy lost more than 350 vessels and ships of various types and displacement⁶. Approximately 17,000 soldiers and officers perished on three transports alone -- the Wilhelm Hustlow, the Steuben, and the Goya⁷.

A factor of great importance in the course of the struggle on the lines of communication was the interaction of the branches of the navy among themselves and with the supporting or attached forces. Unlike joint operations, where interaction, as a rule, was organized by the ground-forces chiefs, in the struggle on the lines of communication all the questions of organizing strikes at the enemy's fleet forces and transports were resolved by the naval command element, which determined the forces, areas, times, and objectives to be hit, as well as their sequence.

The struggle on the lines of communication required the involvement of all the forces in the fleets. The improvement of the methods for using them constituted an important element in the development of naval art during the years of the Great Patriotic War, which art formed the basis for the postwar preparation for the conducting of combat actions by various naval groupings at sea.

During the years of the Great Patriotic War a considerable place was occupied by combat actions to defend our own naval communications. In organizing that defense, the navy experienced great difficulties that were linked with the insufficient quantity and the technical level of the forces and means being drawn upon, and also by the lack of perfection in the objective being defended itself -- the transport fleet, which consisted chiefly of obsolete, assorted, mostly slow-moving ships. And if, under these extremely complicated conditions, they successfully resolved this task as a whole, that attests to the high level of skill in the command personnel, the good combat training, and the valor of all the people in the navy.

The Soviet Navy provided for the shipments, by sea, lake, and river, of 9.8 million persons and more than 117 million tons of military and national-economic cargoes⁸.

The defense of the naval communications lines included a broad series of measures. In order to fulfill them, use was made of submarines, aviation, surface vessels, coastal and antiaircraft artillery, as well as mines, nets, and other means. But the chief role was played by surface vessels and aviation.

The command element and headquarters of the fleets persistently sought the most desirable combinations of composition of transport ships in convoys and developed the optimal methods for organizing their protection. The idea of creating large convoys was overthrown, since, although it made it possible to resolve the task with forces that were not large with regard to the number of vessels, it gave the enemy the chance, by means of concentrated strikes, to disperse the convoy and then to destroy it piece by piece. The optimal form of providing for the security of navigation was therefore considered to be the

piloting of through convoys, consisting of as many as ten transports, with a well-substantiated ratio -- depending upon the specific situation -- between the number of ships and the naval forces supporting them.

The organizational measures of the fleet headquarters were reinforced by the measures adopted during the course of the war by the Supreme High Command with regard to the considerable intensification of naval aviation and the equipping of the vessels with new technical means and weapons. All this made it possible to achieve a considerable improvement in the means of defending the lines of communication. The immediate organization of the convoy service in the fleets was carried out by the convoy service offices, which engaged in the formation of convoys and the planning of their movement. Military sections were established in the steamship agencies of the navy, and, on large-scale ships, the officer position of deputy captain for military affairs.

The defense of the naval communication lines was guaranteed by the fleets chiefly by way of their daily activity. At the same time, under definite conditions, special operations were planned and conducted. The need for them arose in those instances when it was necessary to carry out the convoying of a large number of ships or transports with troops and important cargoes under conditions of considerable enemy counteraction. The greatest amount of experience in this regard was acquired by the Northern Fleet when organizing the defense of external convoys and the convoying of ice-breakers.

These operations, in the areas of the Barents and White Seas, were carried out systematically with the involvement of the basic forces of the fleet, and in a number of instances also the interacting units of army-group aviation with centralized control. In certain instances the tasks for the operation of supporting the external convoys were assigned by HQ SHC.

Thus, by directive of HQ SHC, dated 19 June 1942, the guidance and responsibility for the operations to be carried out in the Barents Sea to support the convoying of caravans of ships were entrusted to the commander of the air forces of the Northern Fleet⁹. A strike air group of the SHC reserve, air units from the Karelian Front, and fighter aviation from the Arkhangel'sk Military District were transferred to his subordination, and the air-defense aviation of Arkhangel'sk and Murmansk was also drawn upon.

During the operations the Northern Fleet deployed the submarines to intercept the surface forces of the enemy in the event of their attempts to attack the convoy; suppressed the enemy aviation at airfields and at the junctures of the lines of communications approaching the ports and the narrows of the White Sea; and carried out search and destroy missions against submarines and measures to provide antimine security. Fighter aviation was responsible for antiaircraft defense, carrying out, with part of the forces, a constant patrolling over the convoy, and other forces were in a duty status at the airfields.

The Red Banner Baltic Fleet also resolved its tasks by the conducting of an operation in the course of operational regroupings of the troops of the Leningrad Front in 1944 (transfer of the 2nd Shock Army).

This very complicated interrelated complex of measures to defend navigation completely justified itself during the war years and served as a reliable foundation for the further improvement of the art of supporting our naval communications.

It should be noted that the views concerning the use of the fleets in warfare, which were expounded in the official documents of the prewar period, proved as a whole to be valid and corresponded to the conditions that developed during the course of the war. They correctly oriented the naval forces toward the struggle against a strong enemy at sea and on the land. At the same time the commanders and headquarters had to modify their views concerning many questions of the naval art at applicable to the real-life conditions of the situation that had developed, and to search for new forms and methods of combat application of the forces.

The art of employing our oceanic Navy, an art that arose during the postwar years, is based on fundamentally new material means for combat. At the same time it also uses the rich experience of the Great Patriotic War, which continues to be important also under present-day conditions. Here I would like to note first of all the art of organizing the interaction among the branches of the Armed Forces and the branches of the naval forces, the methods of preparing the operations, the art of providing for complete support of the forces, as well as the experience of party-political work. Of great importance to us, especially for the purpose of educating the present generation of sailors, are the glorious combat traditions that were born in the fire of the Great Patriotic War.

FOOTNOTES

1. *Vremennyy Boyevoy ustav Morskikh Sil RKKA 1937 g. (BUMS-37)* [1937. Provisional Naval Combat Regulations (BUMS-37)], Moscow-Leningrad, 1937, p 10.
2. Achkasov, V. I., Pavlovich, N. B., *Sovetskoye voyenno-morskoye iskusstvo v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne* [Soviet Naval Art in the Great Patriotic War], Voenizdat, 1973, pp 253-263.
3. *Ibid.*, pp 313-315.
4. *Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945* [History of World War II, 1939-1945], Vol 8, Voenizdat, 1977, p 152.
5. *Istoriya voyenno-morskogo iskusstva* [History of the Naval Art], Voenizdat, 1969, pp 389, 391.
6. *Boyevoy put' Sovetskogo Voenno-Morskogo Flota* [Combat Path of the Soviet Navy], 3rd edition, expanded, Voenizdat, 1974, pp 320-324.
7. *Ibid.*, pp 321-322.
8. *50 let Vooruzhennykh Sil SSSR* [Fifty Years of the USSR Armed Forces], Voenizdat, 1968, pp 465-466.
9. *Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945*, Vol 5, Voenizdat, 1975, pp 258-259.

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WARTIME EXPERIENCE IN ORGANIZING AIR DEFENSE OF GROUND FORCES

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[Article published under the heading "The Soviet Art of War in the Great Patriotic War," by Candidate of Military Sciences, Col N. Morgulets and Lt Col A. Manachinskiy: "Methods of Increasing the Survivability of Manpower and Materiel in the Air Defense of Ground Forces"]

[Text] During the entire Great Patriotic War there was an unceasing search for effective and dependable air defenses for the ground forces.

The enemy widely employed aviation, artillery, mortars and tanks for neutralizing the organic air defenses. For this reason, the achieving of high survivability in the air defense formations, units and subunits was one of the most important factors in ensuring their combat capability and the successful carrying out of the tasks of secure cover for the troops and installations.

By survivability of the organic air defense resources one understands their ability to preserve and restore their combat readiness and capability under the conditions of active operations by the airborne and ground enemy.

Let us briefly examine certain questions related to increasing the survivability of the organic air defense forces.

During the years of the Great Patriotic War, great attention was given to the technical equipping of the air defense troops for the ground forces.

The number of weapons in the antiaircraft artillery units of the fronts during the war years increased by 8-fold, including by 17-fold for the small caliber ones.

The quantitative and qualitative growth of weapons not only increased the survivability of the air defense forces against actions by the airborne and ground enemy, but also significantly broadened the capabilities of organic air defense. As a result, there was increased dependability in the covering of the troop groupings and installations against air strikes.

The significant growth of the quantitative and qualitative composition of antiaircraft artillery made it possible to improve the TOE structure of the organic air defenses.

Even in the first period of the war, in the aim of the massed employment of antiaircraft artillery, army air defense regiments and antiaircraft artillery divisions of the RVGK [Supreme High Command Reserve] were organized. From June through November 1942, 48 army MZA [small-caliber antiaircraft artillery] regiments were organized (each of these had 3 batteries of 37-mm cannons and 2 companies of DShK [Degtyarev-Shpagin heavy machine guns]). From November 1942, RVGK antiaircraft artillery divisions began to be organized consisting of 4 army air defense regiments (as a total a division had 48 37-mm cannons and 80 DShK antiaircraft machine guns). These divisions were assigned to the combined-arms and tank armies. They provided dependable cover of the troops against low-altitude enemy air strikes. The enemy was forced to alter its tactics, going over to operating from altitudes beyond the reach of the MZA and antiaircraft machine guns. Although the effectiveness of the air strikes declined, they still were sufficiently felt and caused significant losses to the troops. Then Hq SHC [Headquarters Supreme High Command] adopted a decision as of February 1943 to organize antiaircraft artillery divisions of a mixed composition so that they would be able to combat enemy aviation over the entire range of its operating altitudes. In the place of one of the MZA regiments, a SZA [medium-caliber antiaircraft artillery] regiment was created.¹ Thus, the mixed division had the following weapons: 16 85-mm guns and 72 37-mm cannons.² The tank, mechanized and cavalry corps had 4 MZA batteries (16 37-mm guns) and 1 machine gun company (16 DShK). The army air defense regiments had the same composition.

In organic air defense there was a continuous process of increasing the number of antiaircraft artillery units and formations. Thus, by the start of 1944, each front had an average of 5-7 antiaircraft artillery divisions and up to 10 separate RVGK battalions. By the start of 1945, this number had increased up to 9-12 and 10-15, respectively.³

While the army air defense regiments were the first step in moving from the scattering of antiaircraft artillery to the concentrating of its forces and their massed employment, the antiaircraft artillery divisions were the following, higher level. The organization of the regiments and divisions became more standardized and this helped to improve their combat employment and raise the quality of combat control.

Thus, the improving of the TOE structure was carried out by organizing larger units and formations for the purpose of increasing their fire capability. The massed employment of the diverse air defense forces opposed the massed employment of enemy aviation at medium and low altitudes. The organic air defenses operated most effectively at low altitudes which were most often employed by the enemy for making air strikes.

The improvement in the TOE structure contributed to the introduction of more advanced methods of employing organic air defense.

In the first period of the war there was a tendency to provide a cover for as many troops and installations as possible, although with an insignificant quantity of antiaircraft weapons. With an increase in the number of RVGK antiaircraft artillery and the improved leadership over it, good conditions were created for the massing of the air defense forces in the main sectors of troop operations.

At the start of the second period, the questions of the combat employment of the RVGK antiaircraft artillery divisions were made more specific on the basis of combat experience. Large antiaircraft artillery groupings began to be employed. Thus, by the end of May 1943 (in the area of the Kursk Salient), the grouping of air defense forces of the Central Front consisted of 5 antiaircraft artillery divisions, 14 separate MZA regiments and 5 separate SZA battalions. These included 556 antiaircraft guns, not counting the antiaircraft subunits of the troop formations.⁴

During the third period of the war, regardless of the winning of air supremacy in the summer of 1943 by our Air Forces, the activities of enemy aviation remained rather high. For this reason, serious attention as before was given to air defense of the ground forces and this continued to play a significant role. It became a firm practice to concentrate the forces for a more powerful combating of enemy aviation. The creation of the antiaircraft artillery groups ensured the centralizing of control over the antiaircraft artillery and its massing and convenience for cooperation; an opportunity arose for more widely maneuvering the army air defense regiments and the RVGK divisions.

As a whole, the war introduced much that was new in the operational-tactical principles in the combat employment of air defense forces, including: the massing of them on the main sectors, the creating of antiaircraft artillery groups, the forming of deeply echeloned air defense using different caliber antiaircraft artillery systems, antiaircraft machine guns and firearms as well as the broad employment of maneuvering both on the tactical and operational levels.

Thus, the improved TOE structure of organic air defense and the saturating of the divisions, corps and armies with antiaircraft artillery helped to improve the methods of combat employment for the air defense forces, to strengthen the dependable cover of the troop groupings and installations as well as to increase the viability of organic air defense in combat and an operation.

Increased viability depended largely upon the degree of troop training. Combat training during the war years was carried out according to special plans drawn up by the commanders of the air defense units and formations considering the developing situation and the nature of enemy air operations. In the process of the exercises, the personnel steadily continued to study the military equipment, to train on the weapons and instruments and learned the methods of firing at high altitude targets, low-flying and diving aircraft as well as against tanks. The officers endeavored to make certain that the soldiers and sergeants mastered related specialties and could stand in for one another and struggled for teamwork among the crews and platoons. A great deal of attention was given to effective cooperation between the subunits and units. If the situation permitted, regimental and divisional exercises were conducted.

The organizing and realizing of cooperation between the antiaircraft artillery and fighter aviation played an important role in ensuring the viability of the organic air defense forces. This cooperation was based on a dividing of combat zones. The fighter aviation met the enemy antiaircraft at the distant approaches to the covered troop groupings and defended installations while the antiaircraft artillery operated at the near approaches or over the installations. Sometimes the fighter aviation and antiaircraft artillery of the fronts had to operate in a single zone (in the battles of Leningrad, Moscow, Stalingrad and Kursk). In combat practice, instances of mutual covering were frequently encountered. All of this increased the viability of the air defense resources for the ground troops.

An important role was played by the army and front VNOS [air warning] service the data of which were used for the early warning of the fighter aviation and antiaircraft artillery units and formations on the approach of the air enemy. Up to the end of the war, the visual air warning posts comprised the basis of the front VNOS service. Starting in 1943, the fronts began receiving the "Redut" type radars and these sharply increased the capabilities of the VNOS service to detect enemy aircraft, to alert the troops and guide the fire aviation to the airborne targets. The early detection of the enemy made it possible to prepare ahead of time for combat and meet it fully armed. All of this ensured greater efficiency in the combat operations of the air defense forces, it increased their viability and reduced losses.

The experience of the Great Patriotic War showed that engineer organization of the positions and positional areas of organic air defense was one of the most important measures to sharply reduce troop losses from enemy air and ground strikes.

Engineer organization, as a rule, included the creation of structures for the positioning of weapons, control posts, shelters for the personnel, military equipment and materiel. In addition, on the approaches to the firing positions, antitank obstacles were built. The shelters for the antiaircraft guns at the firing positions were built in such a manner as to ensure their convenient positioning for firing. Ramps were built in the aim of a fast entry and exit. Recesses were built to protect the ammunition. Slot trenches were dug for the crews and if there was time, dugouts were built. The firing positions were built in such a manner that the antiaircraft guns located at them could fire not only against airborne targets, but also against ground ones coming from any direction. Thus, on 10 December 1943, the 984th MZA Antiaircraft Artillery Regiment of the 10th RVGK Antiaircraft Artillery Division, with a mission of covering the infantry and artillery battle formations of the 181st Rifle Division of the 13th Army in the area of the Bekha Railroad Station (16 km to the north of Korosten), by 1600 hours was face to face with enemy infantry and tanks. The enemy was ordered by the artillery commander of the 13th Army, Col D. D. Kubeyev, to hold up the Nazis which had gone over to a counteroffensive until darkness in order to provide time for the retreating subunits of the 181st Rifle Division to dig in on a new line. In anticipating combat with a ground enemy, the commander of the 984th Antiaircraft Artillery Regiment, Lt Col Ya. G. Drozdov, ahead of time formed the battle formation in such a manner so that an area of the front 1.5-2 km wide was kept under crossfire of the 37-mm antiaircraft cannons and the DShK machine guns. The regiment's personnel

repelled five enemy attacks, having destroyed 2 cannons, 12 machine guns, 12 motor vehicles and hitting a tank and self-propelled gun. More than 200 enemy soldiers and officers were killed and wounded.⁵ With the onset of darkness, the regiment changed position.

The command posts of the air defense formations and units, as a rule, were located in the center of the battle formation on terrain with a good view. In addition, alternate command posts were organized. Provision was also made for the dispersed and engineer-prepared deployment of equipment and transport or their concealed positioning on the terrain.

During the first period of the war, the batteries were a significant distance apart (7-10 km for the SZA and 2-4 km for the MZA). This did not ensure dependable coverage of the troops and the adjacent antiaircraft subunits. Characteristic of the second and third periods of the war were the closer distances between the firing positions of the SZA and MZA batteries as well as between the batteries and the covered installation, the battery and the forward edge and a more rational placement of the command post in the area of the position. Thus, the reciprocal distance between the SZA batteries was up to 5 km and for the MZA batteries up to 2 km. This ensured the concentrated fire by several batteries against one target and their reciprocal fire cover. The MZA batteries were positioned on the boundaries of the SZA batteries and this increased the effective countering of low-flying bombers and dive bombers. This led to a significant rise in the survivability of the organic air defense forces and the covered troops and installations.

Observation posts of the SZA batteries and the MZA regiments were set up for direct observation of the air enemy and for convenience of control. In certain antiaircraft artillery divisions, in addition to the battery and regimental observation posts, a forward observation post was organized from the division's control battery. All the works at the command posts were connected by communications trenches.

The war showed that the successful defense of the battle formations of the air defense troops against a ground enemy could be ensured only with their close cooperation with the covered troops. If continuous cooperation was not achieved, then the air defense troops suffered significant losses.

During the war years, camouflage was one of the most important measures to ensure viability, since this provided concealed maneuvering and the surprise employment of the air defense troops.

Camouflaging helped to confuse the enemy on the configuration of the air defense troop grouping as well as the covered troops and installations; it reduced the effectiveness of attacks against them.

During the war years, the air defense troops were camouflaged by the following methods: by concealing the position areas (positions) from enemy observation, by creating dummy positions and by confusing the enemy by actions of roaming subunits.

While in the first period of the war one or two guns and a maximum of a MZA platoon were employed as roaming subunits, in the second and third they included a MZA battery. In addition, mixed groups were organized (up to a battery of antiaircraft artillery and a platoon of antiaircraft machine guns). Thus, in April 1945, upon the instructions of the artillery commander of the First Belorussian Front, a SZA fire platoon from the 1991st Regiment and two MZA platoons from the 1987th and 1983rd regiments were moved into the regions of Liebthal, Hersdorf, Rotenburg, and Schliesisch-Drenow with the mission of opening fire against any enemy aircraft within the range of the weapons and thereby avert enemy attention from the areas of actual troop concentration.

Camouflage painting of the weapons and equipment was also employed. Regulation and improvised means were employed for camouflage. For misleading the enemy, there was intensive firing from positions in false troop concentration areas.

The use of the protective properties of the terrain (hilly, forested or mountain-forested) also helped to increase survivability. These were employed most effectively on the subunit scale. Tractor units were concealed in natural shelters such as in small ravines, gullies and so forth. As a rule, camouflaging was checked by ground and air observation.

Maneuvering as one of the methods for increasing the survival of organic air defense against enemy air and ground strikes.

The maneuvering nature of ground forces combat operations, the necessity of providing cover for them in combat, approach-march and march formations by the air defense subunits and units as well as the increased duel between the antiaircraft weapons and the air enemy determined the high maneuverability of the air defense troops in the Great Patriotic War. The maneuvering of the units and subunits was usually carried out in the aim of maintaining continuous cover of the troops in the course of combat operations, for strengthening the air defense groupings in the main sectors, for intercepting enemy aviation on the most probable or newly detected routes of flight as well as for pulling back the air defense units and subunits from under enemy ground and air strikes. In the course of the Great Patriotic War maneuvering was carried out in a short period of time and, as a rule, over short distances in the following instances: when the antiaircraft artillery had remained for an extended time in the firing positions; after carrying out a series of firing when the position area of the antiaircraft artillery had been detected by enemy reconnaissance; in the event of the threat of the capture of weapons by a ground enemy; in making artillery strikes against the positions. Thus, on 27 June 1944, in the area of Zubaki, the Stakhov area (the Third Belorussian Front), the enemy endeavored to break out of an encirclement to the west, threatening one of the batteries of the 1339th MZA Regiment. Two antiaircraft machine gun platoons, in covering the retreat of the battery, allowed the Nazis to come up close and then opened up lethal fire from large-caliber machine guns. The battery, having executed the maneuver, took up a new firing position and here its losses were insignificant.

Maneuvering was also carried out in the aim of ensuring dependable coverage for the troops and installations. During the first period of the war this was

done basically on a tactical scale and in the second and third on an operational-tactical one. This helped to increase the survivability of the covered troops and installations. Usually this was done at night under black-out conditions. Of great importance was the organizing of sound damping and the observing of the covert control rules. The movement of equipment and transport at the firing positions was prohibited as well as the lighting of fires, particularly in areas which could be seen by the enemy. The experience of the war has shown that maneuvering could also compensate for a shortage of air defense forces, thereby increasing the survivability of the covered troops.

An essential factor ensuring the high survivability of the organic air defenses during the war years was the organizing of the recovery of battleworthiness by the air defense formations, units and subunits which had been subjected to enemy air and ground strikes.

Battleworthiness of the air defense forces was recovered by the following: the rebuilding of the control posts, positions and position areas; eliminating damage to the weapons and military equipment; the replenishing of the air defense troops with personnel and materiel.

During the first period of the war, composite groups were organized from the units and subunits which had lost their battleworthiness. These composite groups successfully carried out the set combat tasks. During the second and third periods, significantly more attention was given to the questions of restoring battleworthiness. A repair service was efficiently organized and as a result of this the damaged air defense equipment was quickly repaired not only after evacuation to the rear areas, but also immediately at the firing positions.

Increased survivability depended also upon the moral-political state of the troops. High troop morale during the war years was a most important condition for the troops to carry out the combat tasks confronting them. The entire system of party political work was aimed at forming the required moral-political qualities in the troops and developing the ideological and moral incentives for the exemplary execution of military duty and an inner readiness to defend the interests of their socialist motherland and fight until a complete victory over the enemy.

It must be emphasized that the operational-tactical measures carried out during the years of the Great Patriotic War provided the greatest effect when they were carried out *as a complex*.

The experience of the war confirmed that the greatest survivability of the air defense forces was achieved in creating *mixed groupings* of medium- and small-caliber antiaircraft artillery as well as with *their close cooperation with the fighter aviation*.

The problem of increasing the survivability of air defense troops under present-day conditions is determined by the need to provide defense not only against weapons of mass destruction, but also against the effect of conventional weapons, incendiaries, antiradiation missiles and all types of radioelectronic countermeasures.

For this reason, a study and analysis of the ways for increasing survivability and restoring battleworthiness of air defense troops during the war years to a certain degree can help to solve the analogous problem in training troops under present-day conditions.

FOOTNOTES

- 1 "Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya" [Soviet Military Encyclopedia], Vol 3, Voenizdat, 1977, p 454.
- 2 Ibid., p 459.
- 3 VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 11, 1980, p 29.
- 4 TsAMO [Central Archives of the Ministry of Defense], folio 36, inv. 12552, file 91, sheet 31.
- 5 Ibid., folio 13678, inv. 20058, file 5, sheets 42-43.

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WARTIME EXPERIENCE IN METHODS OF CHEMICAL RECONNAISSANCE

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[Article published under the heading "The Soviet Art of War in the Great Patriotic War" by Docent and Candidate of Historical Sciences, Col (Res) V. Yakubov: "Improving Methods of Conducting Chemical Reconnaissance"]

[Text] One of the factors which prevented the unleashing of chemical warfare against the USSR by Nazi Germany was the high state of readiness of the Soviet troops for chemical warfare defense (CWD) which did not leave the Nazi Command any hope of achieving a surprise chemical attack.

One of the measures of CWD in the war years was chemical reconnaissance of the enemy. The chemical service and the chemical warfare troops devoted particular attention to this over the entire war. The theoretical provisions on its organization and conduct in the Soviet Army were worked out even during the pre-war years and set forth in the corresponding manuals and works.¹

The organization of chemical reconnaissance was entrusted to the unit (formation), commander and staff.

Depending upon whom conducted chemical reconnaissance and for what purpose, this was divided into organic and special.² The duties of the chief of the chemical service in a unit (formation) included direct training of the chemical warfare specialists from the organic reconnaissance bodies as well as special reconnaissance bodies, the setting of their tasks and leadership over their actions.

Organic chemical reconnaissance had the following tasks: establishing the fact of contamination of the terrain; detecting the ways for bypassing the detected areas (regions) and designating the limits of contamination along the route of advance of the reconnaissance body; prompt warning of the superior who had sent out the reconnaissance on the presence of contaminated terrain and the possible ways for bypassing it.

Special chemical reconnaissance should be carried out in the aim of detecting and marking the precise boundaries of contaminated terrain (along the front and in depth); seeking out and marking passages through contaminated areas as well as bypasses of such areas or regions; determining the time and method of

contaminating the terrain; establishing the nature of the soil and plant cover in order, on the basis of these data and considering the meteorological conditions, it would be possible to solve the question of gas decontamination of the passageways and choose the necessary means for the crossing of the contaminated terrain by the troops.

Special chemical reconnaissance was conducted by the chemical patrols consisting of five or six specially trained men. In certain instances this could also be carried out by chemical defense subunits. The chemical patrols were equipped with protective clothing and the following gas detector kits: the chemical reconnaissance bag (SKhR-3) or the chemical reconnaissance instrument (PKhR-40), an indicator box or an indicator drum.

The Great Patriotic War provided a major check of the prewar views and notions on the organization and conduct of chemical reconnaissance and disclosed the shortcomings existing in the theory. The problem was that under the conditions of hard defensive battles and the retreat of the Soviet troops at the outset of the war, many commanders did not pay proper attention to the conduct of chemical reconnaissance, but since the enemy did not employ toxins such an approach to the question of CWD was natural. However, soon thereafter the Soviet Command obtained reliable information that the danger of the starting of chemical warfare by Nazi Germany had not only not declined, but had been steadily growing.³ All of this forced the Supreme High Command to repeatedly issue orders and directives with the demand of paying more attention to the questions of defense against toxins. One of the first such documents was the order of the USSR People's Commissar of Defense, I. V. Stalin, of 13 August 1941 demanding that the chemical defense service be made a part of the troop combat employment and that a decisive end be put to the underestimating of the chemical danger.

The experience of World War I had shown that the most important conditions for effective CWD were continuous chemical reconnaissance and chemical discipline. For example, in June 1918, the German troops suffered a severe defeat at Ypres due to poorly organized chemical reconnaissance and low chemical discipline.⁴

Even the first experience of organizing and conducting chemical reconnaissance in 1941 evidenced a discrepancy in the overall tasks to the content of the very notion of "chemical reconnaissance" as well as to the forces and methods for carrying it out. As is seen from the above-given tasks, chemical reconnaissance was to be carried out basically after the enemy had used the toxic substance and this gave it a passive and secondary role. Reconnaissance sought out contaminated areas, even if it was known that the enemy had not employed chemical weapons. The question of acquiring information on the presence of enemy chemical units on the front and the preparation of the latter for a chemical attack remained outside the perusal of chemical reconnaissance.⁵ The carrying out of this task was entrusted to the personnel conducting chemical observation and this was viewed as an independent CWD measure.⁶ In terms of their capabilities, the spotter-soldiers were unable to fully carry out such a complicated task. The real threat of the use of chemical weapons by the Nazis which arose at the very outset of the war and lasted until its end demanded that chemical reconnaissance first of all establish the fact of the preparation or the beginning of employing toxins by the enemy and the prompt warning of our troops about a chemical danger so that the enemy could not benefit from the surprise factor.

Since the preparation of the Nazi troops to use chemical weapons was carried out particularly secretly, chemical reconnaissance had not only to secure the necessary information about this, but also draw correct conclusions on the basis of very meager data. This is why Hq SHC, the people's commissar of defense and the leadership of all levels of the chemical service gave great attention to the questions of organizing and conducting chemical reconnaissance up to the war's end.

The directive documents of the People's Commissariat of Defense and the RKKA [Worker-Peasant Red Army] Directorate of Military Chemical Defense (from September 1941, the Main Military Chemical Directorate) in the first period of the war formulated the new demands on chemical reconnaissance and defined its tasks and the methods for carrying them out.⁷

Thus, the 1942 "Provisional Instructions on Chemical Reconnaissance" state that chemical reconnaissance should be carried out in the aim of detecting and capturing examples of enemy chemical weapons, detecting and warning of a surprise chemical attack and ensuring the prompt use of chemical protective equipment by the Soviet troops.

During the war years chemical reconnaissance included chemical reconnaissance of the enemy, the reconnoitering of the terrain and local CWD facilities and weather reconnaissance.

The tasks of chemical reconnaissance were determined by the army departments, by the directorates of the fronts and partially also by the Main Military-Chemical Directorate.⁸ In this regard, the chemical reconnoitering of the enemy was carried out by means of strategic, operational and tactical reconnaissance and was marked by strict centralization. The bodies of the chemical service in the troops conducted tactical and operational reconnaissance.

Operational reconnaissance had the following tasks: to detect a grouping of enemy chemical troops in the zone of the front (army), their weapons, position and movement; to detect the supply depots and chemical dumps; to discover CWD measures being conducted in the enemy troops in preparations for the use of chemical weapons.

Tactical reconnaissance was given the following tasks: detecting the means of chemical attack and defense, capturing examples of them, establishing the organization of chemical defense in the enemy troops with which the given formation would be in combat contact; securing documents characterizing the state of military chemical affairs in the enemy troops and disclosing their preparations for using chemical weapons. Chemical reconnaissance was planned for an engagement (operation) and during the period of operational pauses for the period established by the command. The chemical directorates of the fronts usually planned this for a month, and the army chemical departments for 10-15 days. A separate chemical reconnaissance plan was not worked out in the formations and units and its tasks were included in the overall CWD plan.

Various methods were widely employed for chemical reconnaissance of the enemy, including: observation, reconnaissance in force, search, ambushes, the questioning of prisoners, the capturing and collecting of documents, examples of

offensive and defensive weapons, the questioning of local residents, the inspecting of enemy-liberated territory and so forth.

Let us take up the most important of these.

Chemical observation of the enemy was one of the basic methods of chemical reconnaissance and was organized by all branches of troops in any situation. This was carried out in the aim of promptly detecting immediate preparations and the start of an enemy chemical attack as well as for warning our troops of this.⁹ The chemical observation and warning system included chemical observation points and posts as well as covert chemical posts.¹⁰ The chemical observation post was the chemical reconnaissance body of the chief of the chemical service in a unit (formation). This was fielded in all types of combat for constantly observing enemy actions in the aim of promptly detecting preparations for a chemical attack. As a rule, the observation was carried out by the best trained sergeants from the chemical defense subunits. The obtained information was systematically reported to the chief of the chemical service and entered in a log.

In the aim of detecting the moment of a chemical attack, in each company (battery) and equivalent subunits, chemical observation and reconnaissance posts were set out without fail consisting of the person in charge of the post and one or two observers from among the specially trained men. Similar posts were also set out in the dispositions of the rear units.

At nighttime as well as in those instances when the weather and terrain made it possible to carry out wave releases (gas-tank attacks), covert chemical posts consisting of two men were sent out from the chemical observation posts of the first echelon companies. They were to promptly detect the preparations for and start of a gas attack and to warn the person in charge of the post who had sent out the covert post. For establishing the start of a chemical attack, the chemical observation and reconnaissance posts were to give a chemical alert signal.

During the most crucial periods (increased enemy activities, the unsuccessful development of combat operations for the enemy and so forth), officer observation was observed in the regiments, divisions, corps and armies. Being directly at the observation posts of the combined-arms commanders, the chemical officers could utilize the optical observation instruments and communications. This provided an opportunity to obtain very important information about the enemy. For example, the officer observation in the 33rd Army during the period of preparations for the Smolensk Offensive Operation established increased enemy chemical discipline (the required wearing of gas masks, chemical drills and so forth).¹¹ Proceeding from this, the army commander issued an order to adopt additional CWD measures. In accord with this, chemical reconnaissance was strengthened, the supplies of protective equipment were increased, additional decontaminating posts were set up and so forth.

As a whole the chemical observation system during the war years was very extensive. Observation was carried out continuously both on the defense and on the offensive, but particularly great attention was given to it in conducting defensive engagements. For example, in the course of the defense of Stalingrad,

in the 21st Army of the Stalingrad Front, each day observation of the enemy was carried out by around 50 forward and 14 rear chemical observation posts supplied with indicators and signaling devices. In the 7th Guards Army of the Second Ukrainian Front, on 1 June 1944, around-the-clock chemical observation was carried out by 28 posts from the chemical defense subunits (7 divisional and 21 regimental). Moreover, in the field force there were 360 combined-arms and artillery observation posts which were given the task of chemical observation and warning.

The experience of the Great Patriotic War confirmed the importance of chemical observation as a method of chemical reconnaissance. At the same time, it disclosed the need to set special chemical observation tasks not only for the chemical observation posts and points, but for all the reconnaissance resources of the branches of troops, in particular the artillery. Certainly artillery reconnaissance and observation with great precision determined the firing positions of the enemy multibarrel rocket launchers and this could not be done by the chemical observation points and posts.

During the second period of the war, in addition to chemical observation, such methods of chemical reconnaissance as search, ambush and reconnaissance in force were also widely employed.

Search was organized in the aim of capturing operational documents, examples of chemical weapons and prisoners from among the enemy chemical units; for clarifying the dispositions, grouping and movement of the enemy chemical units; for disclosing the presence of chemical ammunition at artillery and mortar firing positions, at dumps and railroad stations.

In a majority of instances, these questions were carried out by organic search parties which included chemical specialists. In individual instances, particularly upon receiving information on enemy preparations for a chemical attack on the bringing up of chemical ammunition or the concentrating of enemy chemical units, special searches were carried out by the forces of the chemical defense subunits (units) headed by an officer from the chemical service.

In all instances the plan for conducting the search was worked out jointly with the chief of the intelligence section (department) of the formation (field force). The chemical service and reconnaissance chiefs were responsible for the preparations and conduct of special search.

Here is one of the characteristic examples of organizing and carrying out a special search in the interests of chemical reconnaissance. In the course of the preparations for an offensive in the Iasi-Kishenev Operation, intelligence of the 240th Rifle Division received information that strongly protected railway cars ostensibly carrying toxins had been moved up to Borsa Station (Northern Romania) which was 25 km from the forward edge. Upon the proposal of the division's chemical service chief, Maj Lykholat, the formation's commander Hero of the Soviet Union, Maj Gen T. F. Umanskiy ordered a search to be carried out. A search party consisting of several men (four chemical troops and three experienced scouts) with a radio was organized. It was headed by the commander of the chemical reconnaissance platoon. The party was sent out to reconnoiter for 5 days. The scouts did not detect any chemical agents at Borsa Station,

but they did secure important information on the nature of enemy defense, the terrain and the ways for bypassing enemy strongpoints.¹³

Raids were organized, as a rule, in the near enemy rear against delivery routes, the movement of officers, liaison, messengers, ammunition carriers as well as in the battle formations. By attacking individual vehicles carrying ammunition, staff vehicles, liaison officers or by observation, information was acquired on the supply of enemy units with protective equipment and on the state of chemical discipline.

Reconnaissance in force, in being carried out by the combined-arms subunits, was frequently employed by the leadership of the chemical service for carrying out chemical reconnaissance tasks. For this chemical scouts were included as part of the forward companies and battalions. In the course of reconnaissance in force, information was acquired on the degree of the antichemical equipping of the enemy trenches, firing points and dugouts, and the supply of chemical protective gear for the personnel; protective equipment, indicators and decontamination equipment as well as documents from the units and formations were captured.

During the war years, particularly starting with the Kursk Battle, the most important source of obtaining data on enemy preparations for starting chemical warfare was chemical **reconnaissance of liberated territory**. The problem was that as the Nazis were driven out of USSR territory and with the approach of our troops to Germany itself, the threat of the use of chemical weapons by the Nazis increased.¹⁴ The most complete data on Nazi preparations could be obtained in the course of such reconnaissance. It made it possible to establish the degree of enemy readiness to employ chemical attack weapons (their nature, the presence of chemical weapons and ammunition dumps, evacuation routes and so forth); to ascertain the CWD state of the enemy troops and rear (organization, availability of protective gear and the level of chemical discipline); to prevent the poisoning and injuring of personnel by food products and water as well as various toxic substances left by the enemy for sabotage purposes inside buildings and on the terrain; to capture examples of attack, protective, indication and gas decontamination equipment as well as documents; to discover chemical enterprises and scientific research institutions, to ascertain the nature of their activities and thereby draw conclusions on the scientific and technical-economic readiness of the enemy to conduct chemical warfare.

Chemical reconnaissance of the liberated territory was carried out in accord with the directive of the Main Military Chemical Directorate by special reconnaissance detachments created in the divisions, armies and fronts.¹⁵

The special divisional reconnaissance detachments were made up from the reconnaissance and observation squads of a separate chemical defense company (5-7 men) and reconnaissance and observation squads from the chemical defense platoons of the rifle regiments. As a rule, the detachment included a field chemical laboratory. As a total it numbered 10-15 men. It was assigned two or three horse-drawn carts and one or two riding horses.

Reconnaissance of the liberated territory started with a careful inspection of the battlefield and the entire terrain in the zone of advance of the division, then examples of chemical weapons and defense were collected, captured documents were studied, local residents were questioned and various samples taken.

As experience showed, the questioning of local residents often provided very important information for understanding the enemy chemical defense service, the location of dumps, depots and so forth.¹⁶ Even such preliminary reconnaissance brought good results. For example, a special reconnaissance detachment from the First Ukrainian Front in reconnoitering the town of Chernovtsy, in a school building discovered an open chemical mine filled with yperite which had been "forgotten" by the enemy and this prevented the injuring of the workers quartered there.¹⁷ In the course of offensive engagements in February 1943, in the area of Kursk, at a captured artillery ammunition dump, chemical reconnaissance discovered 690 150-mm shells with phosgene and 6,200 81-mm chemical mortar shells with diphosgene.¹⁸ Armor-piercing tracer bullets containing toxic substances were discovered frequently among equipment captured by our troops.¹⁹

If any important objects were discovered in the course of such reconnaissance, officer reconnaissance groups were assigned to examine these carefully. These groups operated according to an assignment from the army chemical department or the front chemical directorate. These included highly skilled specialists from the chemical directorates (departments) and institutions of learning.

The experience of the Great Patriotic War shows that chemical reconnaissance conducted systematically and purposefully on all levels and by various methods made it possible for our command to have very complete information on the presence of enemy chemical troops on the Soviet-German Front, their disposition and movement, as well as the measures carried out by the Nazi Command in the aim of preparing for chemical warfare. It put into the hands of the Soviet Command a number of very important documents disclosing Nazi preparations for chemical warfare as well as examples of chemical weapons and chemical protective gear. Indicative for evaluating the activities of chemical reconnaissance was the fact that frequently our command received information on new enemy weapons before the weapons were in the operational units of the Nazi Army. For example, the enemy manual "ND-935--11a 1943" with a description of a new chemical reconnaissance instrument was obtained by our reconnaissance before this instrument was in use in the Nazi troops.²⁰

Thus, chemical reconnaissance secured valuable data which made it possible for the Soviet Command to be rather informed on the enemy's preparations for the use of chemical weapons and in accord with this to promptly carry out the necessary defensive measures. The successful conduct of chemical reconnaissance was ensured by the high level of the combat, special and moral-political training of the reconnaissance body personnel as well as by the effective and active party political work in the troops.

In the postwar period, the American military has employed chemical weapons during the war in Korea and in Indochina. In Vietnam, 1.6 million persons were the victims of American toxins. The toxins damaged 44 percent of the tropical forests and 40 percent of the planted area.²¹ At present, the U.S. Army has binary artillery shells of various caliber, and development is being completed on new charges with binary ammunition for the basic artillery systems, chemical bombs, missiles of the Lance-class and cruise missiles.

In speaking on 15 September 1981 in the U.S. Congress, a Pentagon representative frankly admitted that the equipping of the American army with modern toxins is

designed in order to be able to conduct large-scale chemical warfare in Europe.²²

In line with the increased threat of initiating chemical warfare by the United States, a study of the experience of organizing and conducting chemical reconnaissance assumes exceptionally important significance.

FOOTNOTES

- 1 "Vremennoye nastavleniye po protivokhimicheskoy oborone" [Provisional Manual on Chemical Defense], Moscow-Leningrad, Otdel Izd-va Narodnogo komissariata oborony SSSR, 1936; Ya. Zhigur, "Khimicheskoye oruzhiye v sovremennoy voyne" [Chemical Weapons in Modern Warfare], Voenizdat, 1936.
- 2 Ya. Zhigur, op. cit., pp 154-156.
- 3 For more detail on this see VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 3, 1977, pp 85-86; No 7, 1978, p 88.
- 4 Victor Lefebure, "Zagadka Reyna" [The Mystery of the Rhine], translated from the English, Moscow, Voennoy vestnik, 1926, pp 84-85.
- 5 TsAMO [Central Archives of the Ministry of Defense], folio 74, inv. 12308, file 793, sheet 52.
- 6 "Vremennoye nastavleniye po...", p 53.
- 7 "Pamyatka nachal'niku khimicheskoy sluzhby po khimicheskoy razvedke v boyu" [Memorandum to the Chief of the Chemical Service on Chemical Reconnaissance in Combat], Voenizdat, 1941; "Vremennaya instruktsiya po khimicheskoy razvedke" [Provisional Instructions on Chemical Reconnaissance], Voenizdat, 1942 and so forth.
- 8 TsAMO, folio 340, inv. 5405, file 1, sheet 31.
- 9 "Vremennaya instruktsiya po...", p 30.
- 10 TsAMO, folio 74, inv. 12308, file 889, sheet 12.
- 11 Ibid., folio 341, inv. 5336, file 11, sheet 2.
- 12 Ibid., folio 74, inv. 12308, file 889, sheet 14.
- 13 Ibid., folio 240, inv. 2765, file 61, sheet 484.
- 14 Ibid., folio 74, inv. 12308, file 889, sheets 13-16.
- 15 Ibid., folio 240, inv. 2765, file 61, sheets 287-292.
- 16 Ibid., folio 74, inv. 12308, file 889, sheet 15.

- 17 M. V. Krasil'nikov and G. I. Petrov, "Istoriya khimicheskoy sluzhby i voysk khimicheskoy zashchity Sovetskoy Armii" [The History of the Chemical Service and Chemical Defense Troops of the Soviet Army], Moscow, Izd. VAKhZ, 1958, p 175.
- 18 TsAMO, folio 74, inv. 12308, file 8, sheet 18.
- 19 Ibid., folio 340, inv. 5405, file 9, sheet 31.
- 20 M. V. Krasil'nikov and G. I. Petrov, op. cit., p 139.
- 21 PRAVDA, 7 April 1982.
- 22 PRAVDA, 19 February 1982.

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WARTIME OPERATIONS: THE 64TH ARMY IN BATTLE OF STALINGRAD

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
[Article published under the heading "The 40th Anniversary of the Battle of Stalingrad," by Docent and Candidate of Historical Sciences, Col P. Balashov: "The 64th Army in the Defensive Battle of Stalingrad"]

[Text] The victory at Stalingrad was achieved due to the heroic actions of the troops from all the fronts and armies participating in this historic battle. The valorous troops of the 64th Army made a worthy contribution, too. The given article examines the experience of organizing and conducting combat operations by its formations and units and shows the courage and heroism of the Soviet troops during the period of the defensive engagement for Stalingrad.

In the second half of July 1942, the Nazi Command of the Army Group "B" resolved by attacking from the areas of Perelazovskiy and Oblivskaya along converging axes toward Kalach, to encircle and destroy the troops of the 62nd Army and a portion of the forces of the 64th Army and then to capture Stalingrad. For this purpose, behind the LI Army Corps, it hurriedly moved up into the zone of advance the XXIV Tank Corps which had been transferred from the 4th Tank Army to the 6th Field Army (see the diagram).

In order to prevent the enemy from breaking through to Stalingrad, in accord with the directive from the commander of the Stalingrad Front,¹ the troops of the 64th Army by 19 July were to take up a strong defense along the line from Surovikino to Verkhne-Kurmoyarskaya up to 120 km long. The army included the 214th, 29th, 229th and 112th Rifle Divisions, the 66th and 154th Naval Infantry Brigades, the 40th and 137th Tank Brigades, the 76th Guards Mortar [Rocket Launcher] Regiment, four artillery regiments and two tank killing artillery regiments of the RVGK [Supreme High Command Reserve], the 28th and 40th battalions of armored trains and four cadet regiments from the Zhitomir, the 1st and 3rd Ordzhonikidze infantry and the Krasnodar mortar-machine gun military schools.³

The army staff had worked out a plan of defense, in accord with which the basic efforts were to be concentrated on the right flank. The troops were deployed in two echelons and a reserve was organized. The army's first echelon was to include the 229th, 214th and 29th Rifle Divisions and the 154th Naval Infantry Brigade. The width of the defensive zone for the first echelon formations was



Defensive engagements of the 64th Army troops from 25 July through 12 September 1942

Key: 1--Position of 64th Army by 25 July 1942; 2--Position of 64th Army by 30 July 1942; 3--Position of troop group of Gen Chuykov on 2 August 1942; 4--Position of 64th Army by 9 August 1942; 5--Position of 64th Army by 12 September 1942; 6--Counterstrikes by troops of 64th Army

22-30 km. Some 20-30 km behind the forward edge of the first line, an army defensive line was prepared up to 30 km wide and this was to be occupied by the 112th Rifle Division as the army second echelon. In the army's reserve were the 66th Naval Infantry Brigade, two battalions of the 137th Tank Brigade and three cadet regiments. Temporarily, until the approach of the 229th and 214th Rifle Divisions, the 196th Rifle Division of the 62d Army was deployed on the indicated line under an order from the front's commander.

The troops of the 64th Army were deployed in an exceptionally difficult situation. The problem was that they had moved up from the interior under continuous enemy air actions. For this reason, only the 229th and 214th Rifle Divisions had reached the lines designated for the defense and this was achieved only on 22 July and not on 19 July, as had been planned. The 154th Naval Infantry Brigade arrived somewhat later in the area of the defensive line.

The troops of the 229th and 214th Rifle Divisions prepared for around 2 days for defense in the main zone. All the other formations were forced to occupy it in the course of the engagements. In organizing the fire plan, attention was paid first of all to the readiness of the antitank artillery for combat. For repelling the enemy tank offensive, in the battalion defensive areas antitank strongpoints were organized and antitank areas deep in the division's defenses. An important role in countering enemy tanks was assigned to the tank reserves.

The forward detachments of the formations were the first to encounter the approaching units of the LI Army Corps. Fierce battles broke out in the course of which the enemy, possessing superiority in forces, forced them to pull back to the main defensive zone.

The battles for the army's main defensive zone commenced on 25 July. The main thrust by the enemy LI Army and XXIV Tank Corps was made against the units of the 229th Rifle Division. Here the Nazis surpassed our troops by 4-5-fold in personnel and by 9-10-fold in tanks, guns and mortars. Nazi aviation was continuously in the air and attacked the battle orders of the army's formations in groups of 60-70 aircraft. After 2 days of heavy battles the enemy succeeded in breaking through the defenses of the 229th Rifle Division and reach the crossing over the Don in the area of Nizhne-Chirskaya. The units of the formation were forced to pull back to the eastern bank of the Chir River.

The troops of the 214th Rifle Division steadfastly defended their lines. In a day they drove off 8-10 enemy attacks. After 4 days of heavy battles, the 214th Rifle Division and the 154th Naval Infantry Brigade upon an order of the army commander pulled back to the left bank of the Don.

The driving in of the Nazi troops to the south of Surovikino created a threat of enveloping the left flank of the 62nd Army and breaking through into the rear of the 64th Army. A difficult situation also had developed on the right flank of the 62nd Army. To the north of Kalach, the Nazi troops had succeeded in breaking through to the Don. In such a situation the army commander, upon orders from the front commander, decided to prepare and conduct a counterstrike on 30 July (in the aim of eliminating the enemy breakthrough) in the area of Novomaksimovskiy. For this the 112th, 204th and 321st Rifle Divisions and the

XXIII Tank Corps were to be used. From the air the troops of the counterstrike grouping were to be supported by the 8th Air Army. Regardless of the fact that the time for preparing the counterstrike was limited, the Soviet troops succeeded in routing the enemy in the area of Novomaksimovskiy and the remnants of its units were thrown back to the western bank of the Chir River.⁴

The resistance of the troops in the Stalingrad Front was continuously growing. The plan of the Nazi Command to capture Stalingrad with just the forces of the 6th Army was upset. In a report to Hitler on 30 July, Gen Jodl stated that the fate of the Caucasus would be determined at Stalingrad. For this reason, it was essential to shift a portion of the forces from Army Group "A" to Group "B". On the following day, the 4th Tank Army was shifted from the Caucasus sector to the Stalingrad sector and this became the main one on the entire Soviet-German Front. From this time the situation in the area of the 64th Army became even more complicated.

Due to the deep driving in of the formations from the enemy 4th Tank Army into the defensive zone of the 51st Army in the area of Kotelnikovskiy, the front commander ordered that the troops of the 64th Army pull back to a line of Logovskiy and the northern bank of the Myshkova River. The retreating formations of the 51st Army and the reserve units of the 64th Army on 2 August began to take up the defensive on the eastern bank of the Don to the south of Nizhne-Chirskaya, and further along the Aksay River. For countering the enemy grouping which had broken through in the region of Kotelnikovskiy, an operations group was set up consisting of three rifle divisions and a naval rifle brigade under the command of the deputy commander of the 64th Army, Lt Gen V. I. Chuykov. The situation in which the group's combat operations developed was extremely complex. The enemy surpassed our troops in manpower and equipment. Enemy aviation was superior in the air. For this reason all troop movements were made at night and counterattacks were conducted at the end of the day or early in the morning. In the fierce battles the group's troops showed steadfastness and courage having supported a regrouping of the army's forces and the organizing of defenses on the new line.

In order to concentrate all the attention of the 64th Army's commander on repelling the enemy offensive in the Kotelnikovskiy sector, on 3 August the front's commander turned over to the 62nd Army a defensive sector from Surovikino to Nizhne-Chirskaya along with the 229th and 112th Rifle Divisions which were defending here. At the same time, the 64th Army was reinforced by the 208th Rifle Division and several units. However, regardless of the adopted measures, it was impossible to check the enemy offensive. The Nazis continued their drive toward Stalingrad. On 6 August the troops of the enemy 14th Tank and 29th Motorized Divisions reached the area of the 74-km siding. Behind them the 4th Romanian and 94th German Infantry Divisions began to move up from the rear.

Fierce battles broke out. The Nazi Command threw 150-200 tanks supported by infantry into the attack. At the same time, 200-300 enemy aircraft made air strikes. The growing enemy pressure was heroically repelled by the 126th and 38th Rifle Divisions under the command of Cols V. Ye. Sorokin and G. B. Safiulin as well as other formations and units.

In the developing situation, Gen M. S. Shumilov decided to continue to check the enemy advance on the right flank and in the center on the line of the Aksay River while simultaneously, on the left flank, preparing and carrying out a counterstrike against the enemy grouping which had broken in the area of siding 74. This decision was approved by the front's commander.

For carrying out the counterstrike, a troop grouping was organized consisting of three rifle divisions, two cadet regiments, a rocket artillery regiment, a heavy artillery battalion and an armored train. In a zone 9 km wide in which the counterstrike grouping was deployed, a density was achieved of one rifle division for every 3 km, up to 40 guns and mortars and around 8 tanks per km of front. For the first time since the start of the battle for Stalingrad (although in a narrow sector) superiority over the enemy was achieved: by 3-fold in terms of personnel, by 2-fold in artillery with an equality of tank forces.⁵ The thorough and careful preparations for the counterstrike under the army commander's leadership proved effective.

On the morning of 9 August after a 40-minute artillery softening-up, the assault grouping went over to the offensive. In the course of the counterstrike the Soviet troops threw back the enemy from siding 74. In the 2-day battles, up to three regiments of enemy infantry were defeated and more than 100 tanks hit. The thrust was so strong that the enemy during the subsequent 10 days was unable to resume the offensive in this sector. In recalling these battles, the author of the history of the Wehrmacht's 14th Tank Division, Holf Grams, has written: "These were difficult days for the tank and artillery regiments. The situation was exacerbated by a shortage of fuel and ammunition. The exposed steppe expanses provided notable advantages for the enemy tanks with their wider operating range."⁶ During the tank battles which occurred here and lasted until 17 August, both sides suffered significant losses. Regardless of the successes in the area of siding 74, the situation in the zone of the 64th Army continued to remain taut.

At the end of August, the enemy succeeded in putting up a permanent crossing over the Don and in a short period of time reinforced its assault grouping. Having regrouped its forces in the area to the west of Abganerovo, on the morning of 29 August, after an air and artillery softening-up, it attacked on the Zety axis. Having broken through the defenses of the 126th Rifle Division, the enemy tank formations began to exploit the success. This put the 29th and 138th Rifle Divisions in a difficult situation. A threat was also created against the rears of the 64th and 62nd Armies. Considering this, the Soviet Command resolved to pull back the troops of the 64th and 62nd Armies by the morning of 31 August to a middle defensive perimeter. By the beginning of September they were pulled back to the inner perimeter. Over a period of 10 days, starting on 3 September, the units of the 64th Army defended stubbornly in the occupied positions, checking the advance of the enemy infantry and tanks.

In the middle of September, the battles directly approached the western limits of Stalingrad. The defense of the city was entrusted to the troops of the 62nd and 64th Armies. By this time, the 64th Army included seven rifle divisions which had been weakened in the previous battles (the 126th, the 138th, the 157th, 29th, 204th, 38th and the 36th Guards), the 66th and 154th Naval Infantry Brigades, two cadet regiments (from the Krasnodar and Vinnitsa infantry

schools), the 118th Fortified Area, the XIII Tank Corps and 14 artillery and mortar regiments. The width of the field force's defensive zone was 25 km. Its operational configuration was single-echelon. The army commander had concentrated the basic efforts on the right flank. Here in the area to the northwest of Beketovka was located the reserve of the army commander (the 38th Rifle Division and the cadet regiment from the Vinnitsa Infantry School). Combat operations were supported by the artillery fire of a brigade of river vessels from the Volga Naval Flotilla.

The Nazi Command intended to capture the city by storm. Having regrouped its forces, it decided to make two simultaneous thrusts: one from the area to the northwest of Kalach to Mamayev Kurgan and the other from the region to the north of Verkhne-Tsaritsynskiy in the direction of the Central Station. This was to involve three infantry, two tank and one motorized division with around 250 tanks.

The offensive of the Nazi troops commenced in the morning of 13 September after heavy artillery and air softening-up. The thrust of great strength was made against the formations of the 62nd and 64th Armies which had been significantly weakened in previous battles and which were defending in the area of the settlement of Kuporosnoye. On the following day the Nazis broke through to the Volga. The right flank of the 64th Army was exposed. The threat arose of the enemy reaching the rear of the 64th, 57th and 51st Armies. In such an exceptionally difficult situation, Gen M. S. Shumilov capably and energetically directed the field force's troops. As the Nazis advanced along the Kuporosnoye Embankment toward the Volga, he increased the forces on the right flank and then made a strong counterthrust against the enemy. Regardless of this, the Nazis still succeeded in forcing back the right flank army formations and capturing the settlement of Kuporosnoye.

In order to weaken the enemy pressure on the troops of the 62nd Army, the commander of the front on 18 September ordered the commander of the 64th Army to prepare and carry out a new counterthrust on the axis of Kuporosnoye and Mamayev Kurgan, while the commander of the 62nd Army was to attack from the area of Mamayev Kurgan to the south. As a result of the counterthrust, the formations of the 64th Army caused the enemy great losses and distracted a portion of the enemy forces.

In the second half of October, the 62nd Army was fighting heavily in the area of the Tractor and Barricades plants. For helping its troops, the command of the Stalingrad Front decided to again make a counterthrust in a northerly direction using the forces of the right flank formations from the 64th Army. For this the VII Rifle Corps of Maj Gen S. G. Goryachev and the 40th Tank Brigade were transferred to the field force. In addition, the 422nd Rifle Division of Col I. K. Morozov was to be involved in the counterthrust; in September this division had been transferred from the 57th Army. The actions of the assault grouping were supported by an army artillery group consisting of three artillery cannon regiments, two floating batteries, the gunboats "Rudnev" and "Gromov," five rocket artillery regiments and two battalions.⁸

The offensive by the Soviet forces started at 1000 hours on 25 October with a rapid attack by units of the VII Rifle Corps and the 422nd Rifle Division.

Over a period of 3 days, they destroyed around 5,000 soldiers and officers, hit and set afire 8 tanks and destroyed 59 various-caliber guns, 58 machine guns and shot down 15 enemy aircraft.⁹

During these battles the 93rd Rifle Brigade of Lt Col N. Z. Galay, 96th Rifle Brigade of Col F. P. Berezhnyy and the 97th Rifle Brigade of Maj Gen V. V. Tikhomirov particularly distinguished themselves.

The corps commissar M. P. Bystrov showed courage and heroism. During a critical moment of the battle for elevation 146.0, he rose up and led the men into an attack. An enemy bullet cut down the hero. At present a street in Kirovskiy Rayon of Volgograd bears the name of the commissar M. P. Bystrov.

As a result of the active offensive operations by the right flank formations of the 64th Army, the enemy was forced to maintain significant forces in this sector, to move up reserves here and for several days halt the offensive in the industrial part of Stalingrad. Thus, the situation of the 62nd Army was somewhat improved. A critical moment in the defense of Stalingrad had been passed.

The Nazi Command, not counting the casualties, endeavored at any price to capture Stalingrad. Around 54 divisions of Wehrmacht troops and Nazi satellites were involved in the bloody, extended battles, but they were unable to capture Stalingrad. This main grouping of Nazi troops suffered so many casualties that in mid-November it was forced to break off the offensive and go over to the defensive.

The Soviet troops which defended Stalingrad carried out the mission entrusted to them. They bled the enemy assault grouping white, they gained time for preparing and moving up the strategic reserves and thereby created conditions for going over to a counteroffensive and defeating the entire enemy grouping which had broken through toward Stalingrad. In carrying out this very important task a major contribution was made by the troops and the command of the 64th Army which showed flexibility in troop control. All the decisions and orders of the army commander and the formation commanders were efficiently issued to the executors. The staffs of all levels always knew the needs and requests of the units and formations. Their workers, like the company and battalion commanders, during the difficult moments of combat were in the trenches with the men and took direct part in repelling the enemy attacks. The constant personal contact between all levels of commanders and the soldiers was a guarantee for steadfastness and confidence in victory and this inspired the Soviet troops to heroic feats.

An important condition for successful defense was the maneuvering of the army formations and units to those areas where the threat of an enemy breakthrough had arisen. Thus, only as a result of the prompt increasing of forces on the army's right flank during the second half of September was it possible to repel an offensive by the Nazi troops from the settlement of Kuporosnoye to the south, along the banks of the Volga. The prompt organizing of an operations group under the command of V. I. Chuykov also serves as an example of flexibility in troop control.

The army's troops conducted the defensive actively. Several counterthrusts were prepared and carried out. The experience of conducting them showed that the aims of the counterthrusts were achieved more completely in those instances when the necessary time was allocated to prepare for them.

The combat practice of defensive operations by the 64th Army at Stalingrad disclosed that with the gradual deployment of the troops it was essential to organize and send forward over significant distances strong forward detachments in the aim of occupying and holding advantageous lines ahead of the main defensive zone. This made it possible to gain time to reinforce the defenses, to cause the enemy losses and force it to deploy its main forces before approaching the main defensive line.

Also instructive is the fact that for countering enemy tanks, in addition to antitank artillery, use was also made of the regimental antiaircraft artillery, a significant portion of the divisional antiaircraft artillery, ground attack aviation, mixed minefields, antitank brigades and Molotov cocktails. However, the insufficient development of the tactical zone as well as the lack in certain instances of troops on the defensive lines located in depth impeded the consistent repelling of enemy infantry and tank attacks on each line. This, naturally, told negatively on the course of the defensive actions by the formations and units of the 64th Army.

As a whole, the formations and units of the 64th Army during the period of the defense of Stalingrad gained valuable experience in conducting defensive operations and this experience was successfully employed by the Soviet troops in the further course of the war.

FOOTNOTES

- 1 The Stalingrad Front was set up on 12 July 1942. The commanders of the front were: Mar SU S. K. Timoshenko from 12 July, Lt Gen V. N. Gordov from 23 July and Col Gen A. I. Yermenko from 13 August.
- 2 [Not in report.]
- 3 TsAMO [Central Archives of the Ministry of Defense], folio 341, inv. 6217, file 145, sheet 21.
- 4 Ibid., folio 342, inv. 5312, file 9, sheets 62, 63.
- 5 "Velikaya pobeda na Volge" [The Great Victory on the Volga], Voenizdat, 1965, p 85.
- 6 Quoted from the book by A. M. Samsonov, "Stalingradsкая битва" [The Stalingrad Battle], Moscow, Nauka, 1968, p 120.
- 7 [Not in report.]
- 8 TsAMO, folio 341, inv. 5312, file 45, sheet 5.
- 9 Ibid., sheet 14.

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ROLE OF MILITARY STRATEGY IN PREPARING A COUNTRY FOR WAR

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[Article, title as above and "Based on the Experience of World War I and World War II," by Candidate of Military Sciences, Maj Gen L. Korzun]

[Text] In Soviet military art, by military strategy which is the highest area of this art, one understands that component part which encompasses the theory and practice of readying a nation and its armed forces for a war, the planning and conduct of the war and the strategic operations. Among other problems, military strategy, as a system of scientific knowledge, works out the theoretical bases of the planning, preparation and conduct of a war, while in the area of practical activity it is concerned with the elaboration and implementation of measures to prepare both the armed forces as well as the theaters of military operations, the nation's economy and population for the war.¹

Thus, the elaboration of the theoretical bases and the practical activities to ready a nation for war is one of the most important functions of military strategy. To a significant degree, the success of the course and outcome of a war depends upon its solution. In this regard a study and analysis of the experience of strategy's involvement in the preparation of the world's major states for World Wars I and II and the disclosure of definite trends and directions in this area are of undoubted theoretical and practical interest.

A definite involvement of strategy in the preparation of any state for a war has occurred since its appearance, that is, with the rise of wars and armies. Here over a long historical period, both the significance and scale of the very preparations of a nation for war as well as the degree of strategy's involvement in this were comparatively restricted, although these were constantly rising. Their role and scale began to increase more quickly and significantly in the 19th Century, particularly with the entry of capitalism into the stage of imperialism, in keeping with the sharp quantitative and qualitative development of weaponry and the transition to mass armies.

However, regardless of the obvious existence and constant development of strategy's function in the preparation of a nation for war, for a long time strategy was not put by military theory into an independent category and, in essence, was concealed behind the general formula of strategy's involvement in the "preparation of a war." As strategy became more concrete, it still, as a rule,

was reduced at best to the preparation of the theaters of military operations or remained within the confines of the preparation of the armed forces. Even in articles devoted to military strategy in all three editions of the "Bol'shaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya" [Great Soviet Encyclopedia], the role of military strategy in essence was restricted to the preparation of the armed forces for a war. However, military art has developed continuously. "The development of military art," pointed out the member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Minister of Defense, Mar SU D. F. Ustinov, "represents an ongoing and complex process encompassing all its parts.... The scope of strategy has been increasing and the contents of its tasks have become more complex."²

The necessity of preparing a state for war, the increased significance of this task and the strengthening of strategy's role in carrying it out are determined by many factors and primarily by the very close reciprocal link between strategy, politics and the economy. This linkage was first disclosed and very clearly defined by the founders of Marxism-Leninism. F. Engels from the positions of materialistic dialectics directly pointed out that "an act of violence...is a political act." He pointed to the dependence of strategy upon the level of production achieved at a given moment and that "all the organization of armies and the methods of conducting combat employed by them and at the same time the victories and defeats are dependent upon the material, that is, the economic conditions: upon the human material and upon the weapons and, consequently, upon the quality and quantity of the population and upon technology."³

V. I. Lenin emphasized that "strategy is subordinate to policy and both are inseparably interlinked."⁴ This Leninist thesis has been convincingly confirmed by the experience of World Wars I and II. In preparing for them and in the course of armed combat, policy set the goals of the opposing coalitions and each individual nation involved in them, the methods of preparing and conducting the war, it set for strategy specific tasks and endeavored to create the best conditions for carrying them out. But policy itself utilized the ideas and conclusions of military strategy in relation to the probable nature, scope and duration of the forthcoming wars, the most effective methods of conducting them, the military-strategic estimates of the situation in the world as a whole and in the probable enemy states as well as the recommendations on the best preparations to achieve the set political goals in the course of the war and so forth.

Before World War I, German imperialism set the overall political goal of achieving a reapportionment of the already divided world, winning away colonies from its basic imperialist rivals and establishing its own rule in them. The nature and content of this political goal determined the essence of the demands on military strategy. These were disclosed by F. Engels who in 1887 wrote that "for Prussia--Germany, at present any other war but a world war is impossible. This would be a universal war of previously unprecedented scope and unprecedented force."⁵ Then he gave an amazingly accurate prediction of the nature, scope and outcome of a war which commenced 27 years later. Such was the strength of his irreproachably class analysis, in the expression of V. I. Lenin.

The particular features of Germany's preparations for war in many ways were determined by the prospect of waging it simultaneously on two fronts. The chief

of the German General Staff, Field Mar von Moltke, even in 1871 had written that "the most dangerous testing for the existence of the young German Empire would be a simultaneous war against Russia and France and since the possibility of such a combination cannot be excluded, then it is essential ahead of time to take into consideration the means for defense under such conditions."⁶

The German political leadership and the General Staff planned a pre-emptive attack. Here a successive defeat of the enemies in the West and East was considered the most effective. In accord with the von Schlieffen Plan of 1905, the main thrust was to be made initially against France. Several weeks were assigned to carry out this mission after which the major forces were to be shifted from the Western Front against Russia to defeat it.

German preparations for World War I were actually organized and carried out on the basis of this plan. The adventuristic nature underlying the von Schlieffen Plan was ultimately felt in those major miscalculations in the nation's preparations for war and which were disclosed in the course of it. Having greatly miscalculated in estimating the real forces and potential capabilities of the enemies, German strategy defined a future war as short-lived which, having been commenced in the summer, could be completed before the fall.

For carrying out the von Schlieffen Plan it would be essential to have a mass army which possessed significant superiority over the enemy and was prepared for a powerful pre-emptive strike. Since the extended conduct of a war was not anticipated, no provision was made for a major development of mass military production in the course of the war, the shifting of the entire economy to a wartime footing and so forth. Incidentally, an analogous miscalculation was also made by Germany's ally, Austro-Hungary, and by its opponents, England, France and Russia.

Thus, German strategy on the eve of World War I, having been given its tasks by the political leadership and the imperialist monopolies standing behind it, proposed a plan for carrying out these tasks and after its approval determined its needs for preparing the nation for war. Germany endeavored to get a jump on its opponents in the quantitative and qualitative growth of weapons, in training a mass army and in creating conditions for its rapid mobilization. The size of the army grew. From 1874, it doubled in the peacetime ground forces.⁸ In response the size of the Russian and French armies also grew.

The Entente states also intended to carry out their tasks in a war by an offensive and carried out the corresponding preparations of the armed forces and the nations. Here France, in counting on the diverting role of a Russian offensive at the outset of the war, in essence, even in the planning of the war surrendered strategic initiative to the enemy. England, considering its main task to be the winning of victory at sea, assigned an auxiliary role to its own ground forces.

Proceeding from the military-political and strategic goals, a campaign was started up for ideologically influencing the armed forces personnel and the entire population. Its essence and role subsequently, in 1921, were very precisely stated by the prominent proletarian military leader and theoretician M. V. Frunze: "The bourgeois class which rules in Germany has subordinated all

the life of the nation to the basic state goal of victory over competitors. The press, science, art, education and the army--everything is organized and focused by the bourgeoisie on a single spot. The bourgeoisie has succeeded in distorting and subordinating even significant strata of the German proletariat to its influence.... On this basis, in this atmosphere of universal obedience to the Army and Navy and on the basis of a more active foreign policy which has given the army definitely offensive tasks, no other German military doctrine could be created except for the one we see at present. In the personnel of the General Staff and the entire German Army...better than anywhere else is reflected the entire Germany of the complacent bourgeoisie and landowners confident of their strength and lulled with the dreams of world power. 'Germany Over All' is the motto which has poisoned the conscience of a majority of the German people in the age of imperialist war. And the German regiments loyal to this motto, in confidently following the principles of their doctrine, in a destructive wave flooded onto the plains of Belgium in 1914."⁹

An analogous picture can also be observed, in truth, in a less "total" variation in the other major imperialist states. The military contributed a good deal to creating a true bacchanalia of chauvinism and mutual hate, while the politicians intended to reap its fruits for their own purposes. In conducting more intense preparations for war, Germany outstripped its rivals in the technical equipping of the army as defined by the requirements of strategy. For this reason, France and Russia, seeing their lag in the development of weapons and armed forces as a whole, adopted new extensive armament programs.

But significant time was needed to carry them out.

The German military, in considering the preparations for war to be complete, began to work intensely to accelerate the outbreak of war. In the book published in 1913 entitled "Germany and the Future War," Gen Bernhardt expressed its aspirations in writing: "We should...constantly realize that under no circumstances should we avoid a war for our status as a world power and the task is not to put it off as long as possible but, on the contrary, to start it under the best conditions."¹⁰ In endeavoring to accelerate the starting of a war in accord with its military-political and strategic assessment of the situation in the world, the German leadership literally provoked it. Thus, Kaiser Wilhelm in the margin of a report from Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg on the conflict situation in the Balkans, made a note that ultimately a provocation would be needed to obtain an opportunity to make an attack and that with adroit diplomacy and a cleverly controlled press it would be possible to create this provocation and hold it in constant readiness.

In characterizing the choice by Germany of the moment for initiating a war, V. I. Lenin wrote that it found "the most convenient, from its viewpoint, moment for the war, employing its last advancements in military equipment and anticipating the new weapons already planned and undertaken by Russia and France."¹¹

The role of strategy in the preparations for World War I is most clearly seen from the example of Germany. This role was analogously apparent also in the preparations of the other imperialist powers.

It is essential to point out that in turn strategy was constantly influenced by politics and the economy in the course of war preparations. This was reflected primarily in strategic planning. For example, the successor of von Schlieffen in the post of chief of the German Staff, von Moltke the Younger, under the pressure of the Ruhr industrialists and Prussian Junkers strengthened the German troop grouping on the left wing of the Western Front and in East Prussia, having weakened it in the sector of the main thrust. As a result, in the sector of this thrust against France, it was possible to create only a 3-fold superiority instead of a 7-fold one and this was one of the reasons for the collapse of Germany's strategic plans.

As a whole, the role of strategy on the eve of the war was noticeably broadened and intensified. Undoubtedly this was one of the elements in the overall militarization of all aspects of social life in the imperialist states. However, during that period the role of strategy was not yet fully apparent in a number of problems and primarily in the area of the military-economic preparations of the states. Previously we have already mentioned the mistake of the German and other general staffs in determining the duration of the war. This was also reflected in the creation of mobilization reserves. The weapons and ammunition which the leading capitalist nations had at the start of the war were sufficient only for several months. For example, the French General Staff set the mobilization supply of artillery shells at approximately 6.5 million units while actually 305 million were expended.¹² This was the price of just one miscalculation by strategy in the area of the preparation of the states for the war.

Prior to World War II, all the actual data and the theoretical views on the problem of the preparation of nations for World War I were carefully studied and analyzed. For example, it was recognized that one of the reasons for serious miscalculations in the military-economic preparations was the lack of special bodies which would plan, organize and direct such preparations. In Germany the question was even raised of creating a special economic General Staff.

Although after World War I and particularly as a result of the victory of Great October, imperialism began to fear mass armies and because of this various theories about small professional armies became somewhat widespread, in official military policy of the major imperialist states, however, the emphasis was put on creating mass armed forces and preparing a large group of reservists who could be called up into the Army and Navy on the eve of or immediately with the start of a war.

The Communist Party, in steadily carrying out a Leninist peace-loving foreign policy, was forced to adopt the necessary measures to ensuring the secure defense capability of our motherland and for complete preparations of the Soviet state for a future war in the event that the imperialists would start it. The General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, has emphasized that "our party anticipated the possibility of a military clash with the forces of imperialism and prepared the nation and people for defense. The socioeconomic victories of the prewar five-year plans and the ideological-political unity of

Soviet society forged in the course of building socialism put down the foundations for the victory won by our people during the Great Patriotic War."¹³

Soviet military strategy played an essential role in preparing our nation for World War II in which Nazi Germany acted at the attack force of world imperialism. As a whole, Soviet strategy correctly defined the nature and scale of the coming military conflict, the particular features of conducting military operations, the role and relationship of the economic, moral-political and specifically military factors, the basic directions of military organizational development and so forth. Fundamental for it were Lenin's ideas on the nature of the war and on the close link between the military organization of a nation and its entire economic and cultural system and the Leninist principles of the organizational development of the Armed Forces including the most important of them, the total control of this organizational development and the entire question of strengthening the state's defense capability by the Communist Party.

In relying on these Leninist theses, in their works and practical activities M. V. Frunze, M. N. Tukhachevskiy, B. M. Shaposhnikov, V. K. Triandafillov and others devoted great attention to the problem of the preparation of the USSR for war. For example, M. N. Tukhachevskiy emphasized: "Each army should correspond to the economic capabilities of a nation, for only on these capabilities can it actually deploy its combat force and achieve those combat results which politics demands from strategy."¹⁴

Among the works devoted to the problem of the nation's preparations for war, a special place is held by the work of M. V. Frunze entitled "Front i tyl v voyne budushchego" [The Front and Rear in a Future War] published in 1925. In it the outstanding Soviet military leader and theoretician wrote: "The basic and most important conclusion from the experience of the last imperialist war of 1914-1918 is the reassessment of the question of the role and importance of the rear in the general course of military operations." He drew attention to the fact that the inevitability of a revision in the very principles of strategy stemmed from the changes in the nature of warfare. With a clash of first-rate enemies, a victory cannot be achieved by a single blow. The war will assume the nature of an extended and fierce contest which tests all the economic and political underpinnings of the belligerents. In such a war, the rear now is combined with the front. Hence, the new tasks and new methods for preparing national defense. In emphasizing that the task of preparing the nation for defense under present-day conditions extends far beyond the available capabilities of the army and the military department alone, he set as an imperative, vital and essential task "the organizing of the nation even in peacetime so that it could be quickly, easily and painlessly shifted to a wartime footing."¹⁵

Soviet military theory in a fundamentally correct manner also defined the role and place of the superior military control bodies in the preparation of the nation for war. In the work "Mozg Armii" [The Brain of the Army], B. M. Shaposhnikov, in drawing attention to the fact that the General Staff should hold an appropriate place in the control of the war and in the preparations for it, wrote: **"Generally and as a whole, not the General Staff, but rather the government of a state prepares for a war, conducts it and bears responsibility for its success or failure.... As for the General Staff, it through its**

representatives in the "combat bodies" in charge of the preparations for the war on various fronts, should be informed of their work, it must make various proposals in the sense of best satisfying operational needs but not be dictatorial, remembering that...the overstraining of a state's economic force is fraught with the threat of losing the war, no matter how brilliant the battlefield victories might be."¹⁶

Soviet military theory, in emphasizing the dependence of strategy upon the economy, has always also considered its reverse influence, that is, the role of the effect of Armed forces development on the economy. Even F. Engels drew attention to the fact that the army itself plays an important role in economic development. This thesis has been concretized and developed by Soviet military science in terms of the new historical conditions and has been practically realized in Soviet military organizational development.

Thus, military strategy, in posing demands in terms of the quantity and quality of the means of armed combat, substantially influences the volume and scientific-technical level of industrial production, as well as the development of transportation and the means of control. In addition, as the experience of both world wars has shown, it should, and rather accurately, determine the needs of the armed forces for materiel as well as the possible volume of its consumption, losses and so forth. The role of strategy becomes evermore essential in organizing the defense of the economy against armed actions by the enemy.

The experience of World War II fully confirmed the fundamental provisions of Soviet military doctrine on the problem of preparing the nation for war.

In the interwar period, the given problem became one of the central ones as well for bourgeois military theory and the practical preparation for a new world war by the major imperialist states. The importance of this for bourgeois military theory was determined by the fact that the preparations for a new world war by the imperialist powers were carried out on a significantly broader scale than previously as well as on a quantitatively and qualitatively different technical and material basis. Naturally, for each nation the basic directions, scale, nature and specific content of the preparatory measures were determined by their political goals.

For the British Empire, according to the assertion of the well-known English military theoretician Fuller, the immediate strategic tasks were "the conduct of small wars and the maintaining of calm in the nations which were backward in military and political terms (that is, the colonies.--L. K.)."¹⁷ For Germany, immediately after the defeat in World War I, the question of revanche became fundamental. And with the coming of Hitler to power, the goal of winning world domination was turned from a remote prospect into the immediate main political task. But in the preparations of all the imperialist powers for a world war, there was also a fundamentally new factor namely the desire to destroy the Soviet Union by common efforts. Nazi Germany as well as militaristic Japan were chosen by imperialism as the main assault forces for carrying out this task. This played a bitter joke on a number of imperialist states, primarily France and England. Although they had spent colossal amounts and

carried out numerous various diplomatic, economic and specifically military measures, when World War II broke out, their unpreparedness for it was disclosed.

Germany prepared most intensely and purposefully for war, particularly after the seizure of power by the Nazis. These preparations were based upon the ideas of a so-called "total war" formulated by Gen Ludendorff in his book by the same name. These consisted in the fact that all aspects of a state's life in peacetime should be subordinate to the preparations; deceit, blackmail and terror were to be widely used; mass armed forces were to be trained ahead of time and deployed covertly, the war was to be started by a surprise attack for the enemy, the attacks were to be made not only against the armed forces, but also against the peaceful population in order, by terrorizing it, to more quickly break the will to resist, and so forth.

The ongoing further militarization of imperialism had a significant impact on strengthening the role of strategy in the preparations of the imperialist states for World War II. One of the most vivid manifestations of this was the coming to power of the reactionary military in a number of states and the overall strengthening of its influence. The most prominent representative of German militarism, Field Mar von Hindenburg was elected in 1925 and in 1932 was reelected the president of Germany. With his blessings in 1933, the Nazi coup was carried out. In Japan during the 1920's and 1930's, the militaristic governments were repeatedly headed by the most prominent representatives of the reactionary military and they also held the key ministerial posts. Incidentally an analogous picture has been observed in the United States since World War II.

The development of the military-industrial complexes assumed ever-greater significance in the imperialist powers. This term was introduced by Gen D. Eisenhower in 1961 when he left the position of U.S. president. But this complex, in presently representing the main threat to peace in the world, began to develop long before this and not only in the United States. For example, in Nazi Germany many professional military men held leading posts on the boards of various industrial corporations. Gen Milch was a member of the supervisory council of Junkers and Gen Leeb at the Goering plants. The chief of the military economics staff, Gen Thomas, was simultaneously on the supervisory council of the Rheinmetall-Borsig Firm and on the board of the Goering plants.

The dream of the German militarists of setting up a special "military-economic general staff" did not come about before World War II. In essence, this role was filled by the military-economic staff of the OKW headed by the already-mentioned Gen Thomas. The highest body in the area of preparing Germany for war was the Imperial Defense Council (Military Cabinet) headed by Hitler. Along with the leading ministers and the representative of the Reichsbank, its membership included the commanders-in-chief of the armed services. Since 1936 these commanders had been elevated to ministerial rank and received the right to participate in government sessions. Characteristically, a special working committee headed by the chief of staff of the Supreme Armed Forces Command, Keitel, was concerned with the preparation of materials for the sessions of this council and ensuring the fulfillment of the decisions adopted at its sessions.¹⁸

However, regardless of the enormous scope and more careful organization of the all-round preparations of Germany for the war, as was the case on the eve of World War I, serious miscalculations were made in this. These were determined primarily by the adventurist political goals and military strategy of Nazi Germany and their discrepancies to the real capabilities of the state. The broad, literally total military-economic preparations, the early conversion of the economy to a wartime footing, the mobilizing of a mass army and the surprise of attack made it possible for Germany to achieve certain military successes, but also largely due to the major political and military miscalculations of its opponents such as England and France. The blinding of their ruling circles by anti-Sovietism here also played an important role. But in the crucial clash with the USSR the "Blitzkrieg" strategy of Nazi Germany suffered a major defeat. The same occurred with militaristic Japan.

Thus, the experience of the two world wars has shown, on the one hand, a tendency for increased importance, a broader scale and comprehensiveness of the preparations of states for war and a greater role for military strategy in solving the given problem; on the other, it convincingly has shown that political goals are crucial for these preparations. For this reason even the broadest preparations were unable to ensure the achieving of such adventurist and unsound goals as the winning of world domination by Nazi Germany.

Experience has also shown that imperialism has not drawn the correct lessons from the results of the world wars. For this reason, at present, as was emphasized by the 26th CPSU Congress, in the policy of the most aggressive imperialist circles, one can see particularly starkly an adventurism and a readiness to wager the vital interests of mankind for the sake of narrow selfish goals. One of the visible proofs of this is the preparations for war being carried out by the NATO nations and primarily the United States. These preparations are unprecedented in history in terms of scale and diversity. The new pretenders to world domination must not forget how such preparations ended in the past.

At the same time, it is important to consider that the urgency, complexity and importance of the problem of a nation's preparations and the role of military strategy in these preparations continue to grow. Within one limited article naturally only certain fundamental questions of historical experience in solving such a diverse problem could be posed and examined. Further research and a more detailed and specific review of its various aspects are of major theoretical and practical significance under present-day conditions.

FOOTNOTES

- 1 See "Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya" [Soviet Military Encyclopedia], Vol 7, Voenizdat, 1979, pp 555-556.
- 2 D. F. Ustinov, "Sluzhim Rodine, delu kommunizma" [We Serve the Motherland and the Cause of Communism], Voenizdat, 1982, p 75.
- 3 K. Marx and F. Engels, "Soch." [Works], Vol 20, pp 162, 175.
- 4 "Vladimir Il'ich Lenin. Biografiya" [Vladimir Il'ich Lenin. A Biography], 6th Edition, Moscow, Politizdat, 1981, p 500.

- 5 K. Marx and F. Engels, "Soch," Vol 21, p 361.
- 6 Quoted in the book by A. Zayonchkovskiy, "Mirovaya voyna 1914-1918 gg." [The World War of 1914-1918], Vol 1, Gosvoenizdat, 1938, pp 39-40.
- 7 [Not in text.]
- 8 "Istoriya pervoy mirovoy voyny 1914-1918" [The History of World War I of 1914-1918], Vol 1, Moscow, Nauka, 1975, pp 95-96.
- 9 M. V. Frunze, "Izbrannyye proizvedeniya" [Selected Works], Voenizdat, 1977, p 35.
- 10 Quoted from the book by V. Ruge, "Gindenburg. Portret germanskogo militarista" [Hindenburg. A Portrait of a German Militarist], authorized translation from the German, Moscow, Mysl', 1981, p 39.
- 11 V. I. Lenin, PSS [Complete Collected Works], Vol 26, p 16.
- 12 N. A. Talenskiy, "Pervaya mirovaya voyna (1914-1918 gg.)" [World War I (1914-1918)], Moscow, OGIZ, Gospolitizdat, 1944, p 121.
- 13 L. I. Brezhnev, "Leninskim kursom. Rechi i stat'i" [By the Leninist Course. Speeches and Articles], Vol 2, Moscow, Politizdat, 1973, p 90.
- 14 M. N. Tukhachevskiy, "Izbrannyye proizvedeniya" [Selected Works], Vol 1, Voenizdat, 1964, p 180.
- 15 M. V. Frunze, "Izbrannyye proizvedeniya," pp 181, 184.
- 16 B. M. Shaposhnikov, "Vospominaniya. Voenno-nauchnyye trudy" [Memoirs. Military Scientific Works], Voenizdat, 1974, pp 457-458.
- 17 J. F. C. Fuller, "Reformatsiya voyny" [The Reformation of War], Gosvoenizdat, 1931, p 59.
- 18 See "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945" [The History of World War II of 1939-1945], Vol 2, Voenizdat, 1974, pp 293-297.

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STAGES IN DEVELOPMENT OF SOVIET MILITARY SHIPBUILDING

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 7, Jul 82 (signed to press 23 Jun 82) pp 53-58

[Article, title as above, by Hero of Socialist Labor, Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Engr-Adm P. Kotov]

[Text] Our motherland's modern fleet was created and turned into a powerful ocean-going one by the efforts of the Communist Party, the Soviet government and the entire people. Along with the Soviet Army, it securely guards the great victories of socialism and serves as an important means in ensuring the peace-loving foreign policy, restraining the aggressive aspirations of the imperialist states. In all the development stages of the Soviet government, the party, in showing constant concern for strengthening national defense, has given and does give great attention to upgrading the Navy as a component part of the Soviet state's Armed Forces.

Ships have always been, are and will remain the main material and technical base of the Navy's combat might. To a decisive degree they determine its combat might and serve as an indicator of the level of technical equipping. Of great importance for the development of shipbuilding was the party's policy of creating a powerful economy in the nation and achieving a high development level of science, technology and production.

In order to more thoroughly understand the greatness of the people's feat in creating a modern Navy and to better analyze and determine the basic stages through which Soviet naval shipbuilding has gone in its development, we will turn back to our heroic past.

The first years in the existence of the young Soviet state (1917-1922) were characterized by the intensive use of the ships and vessels left by the Old Russia in the armed struggle against the forces of internal counterrevolution and military intervention. At the center of attention of the bodies entrusted with naval shipbuilding at that time were the supply and maintaining of the ships and vessels if possible in a proper technical state. At that time more than 60 industrial enterprises were involved in the reequipping of the vessels, carrying out ship repairs, working on individual ships, manufacturing naval ordnance and carrying out other technical requirements of the Navy. As a whole during the first years of Soviet power, naval shipbuilding held a very small proportional amount in the production plans of the shipbuilding yards.¹

After the Civil War, planned work started in rebuilding the Navy. Here a special role was played by the 10th RKP(b) [Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik)] Congress (March 1921). It decreed: "...In accord with the general state and material resources of the Soviet republic, measures are to be taken to rebuild and strengthen the Red Navy."²

However, at that time the state of industry did not provide an opportunity to begin building new ships. "We...do not possess the means," wrote M. V. Frunze, taking up the problem of developing a navy, "to turn it into that size which would meet the extent of our sea frontiers and the interests of our naval defense. But we are hopeful that an improvement in our economy and the strengthening of our finances will subsequently open up this opportunity for us. As yet, we are restricting ourselves to a program for rebuilding the navy within the limits which we inherited from Old Tsarist Russia."³

The party's decision to strengthen the Navy encountered an ardent response in the hearts of the sailors, the shipbuilders and all the workers. The communists who had been former sailors returned to the Navy. In October 1922, the Fifth Komsomol Congress adopted a decision to provide sponsorship of the Navy. During those days the Chairman of the VTsIK [All-Union Central Executive Committee] M. I. Kalinin wrote: "A maximum of attention should be paid to the Navy. Let each plant, factory, village, volost [an administrative district] and city consider it a duty to help the Navy and be an active participant in its construction."⁴

The first results of the rebuilding of the national economy made it possible to implement the measures essential for developing the physical shipbuilding plant. The ship repair and shipbuilding yards were restored and further equipped and work at them was organized quickly and at a high pace. Vivid evidence of this is the increase in the total ship tonnage for the years: 82,000 tons in 1923, 90,000 in 1924, 116,000 in 1925 and 139,000 in 1926.⁵ As a total during the 1920's, over 100 fighting ships which had taken part in the Civil War were rebuilt and modernized. These included the three ships of the line "Marat," "Parizhskaya Kommuna" and "Oktyabr'skaya Revolyutsiya," the cruisers "Krasnyy Krym," "Chervona Ukraina," "Avrora" and "Komintern," 17 destroyers, 14 submarines as well as patrol boats, minelayers and others.⁶

By the end of the first decade of the existence of Soviet power, the rebuilding of the Navy was basically complete. It had been turned into an organized force capable under those conditions, together with the Red Army, of ensuring the defense of the sea frontiers and protecting the state interests of the USSR. Of important significance for the further rebuilding and construction of the fleet was the 14th Party Congress which set out on a policy of industrialization and the greatest possible development of heavy industry as the basis of strengthening national defense capability. At the end of 1926, for the first time in the history of the Soviet state, a 6-year program of naval shipbuilding was adopted for 1926-1932. This envisaged the construction of 12 submarines, 18 patrol boats, 36 torpedo boats as well as the modernizing and rebuilding of other ships.⁷ The subsequent shipbuilding programs were worked out and implemented within the corresponding five-year national economic plans.

Submarines of the "Dekabrist" class, patrol boats of the "Uragan" class and torpedo boats of the Sh-4 class became the pioneers of the shipbuilding programs. They marked the start to new naval shipbuilding. After them, they began to build small, medium and large submarines of several series of the "Malyutka," "Shchuka," "S," and "Leninets" class and subsequently "K" cruiser class subs, destroyer leaders such as the "Leningrad" and "Kharkov," and other ships of various classes and types.

The genesis of Soviet naval shipbuilding is linked to the implementing of the first two shipbuilding programs. First of all, the physical plant was created on the basis of which the shipbuilding and related industrial sectors were developed. New plants appeared for producing ordnance and ship equipment, production cooperation was organized on a nationwide scale in the interests of shipbuilding and experimental facilities were improved. The designers and scientists gained experience in designing and building ships on the basis of modern scientific achievements. The nation developed skilled shipbuilding personnel.

One cannot but mention the great role which was played at this stage by the Scientific-Technical Committee of the Naval Directorate of the RKKA [Worker-Peasant Red Army] (NTKM). This committee was set up by an order of the USSR Revvoyensovet [Revolutionary-Military Council] on 8 November 1923 and was the superior scientific-technical body of the naval department.⁸ Precisely under the leadership of the NTKM, the first series of ships was worked out. Linked to its activities are the names of the prominent scientists Academicians A. N. Krylov, Yu. M. Shikal'skiy, Yu. A. Shimanskiy and A. I. Berg, the Corresponding Members of the USSR Academy of Sciences A. F. Papkovich and M. Ya. Yasnovskiy, Prof V. G. Vlasov and many scientific designers and organizers of Soviet shipbuilding who made a substantial contribution to the general cause of creating the mighty Navy of our motherland. By its activities, the NTKM, until its abolishing in 1932, prepared the essential conditions for setting up a network of Navy scientific research institutions.⁹

In accord with the Decree of the Labor and Defense Council (June 1933) "On the Program of Navy Construction for 1933-1938," naval shipbuilding steadily increased its pace during the years of the Second Five-Year Plan. By 1935, all the basic shipbuilding yards had been converted to the construction of naval ships. The capacity of the shipbuilding industry was increased by expanding and reconstructing the existing yards as well as by building new ones, including major shipbuilding enterprises in the North and East and, finally, by involving plants which previously had not been engaged in shipbuilding in carrying out the shipbuilding programs. Over the Second Five-Year Plan, industry delivered to the Navy 137 submarines, 25 surface vessels and 176 torpedo boats. Three battleships were modernized and the cruiser "Krasnyy Kavkaz" was fitted out.¹⁰

A new stage in Soviet naval shipbuilding was linked to the party's policy of building a large sea- and ocean-going Soviet fleet. In 1937, a 10-year shipbuilding program was worked out and this envisaged the construction of all classes of ships including battleships, heavy cruisers and aircraft carriers. The policy of building a large sea- and ocean-going fleet ultimately determined

the creation of the large fleets in the Pacific and Baltic theaters which could oppose the naval forces of probable enemies as well as the strengthening of the Northern Fleet and the providing of superior forces in the Black Sea capable of maintaining superiority in this theater.¹¹ The successful fulfillment of the first two five-year plans provided a real physical plant for such construction. With the organization in 1937 of the People's Commissariat of the Shipbuilding Industry, its system included 21 yards with which 200 plants from other sectors cooperated. Ship construction was carried out at a rapid pace. In 1939-1940, the shipbuilding capacity had increased by 3-fold.¹²

World War II which had started and the approaching direct military threat necessitated the making of corrections in the elaborated shipbuilding program at the expense of a certain reduction in the number of large fighting ships and an increase in the special purpose ships (patrol boats, minesweepers and particularly subchasers).

During the years of the five-year plans which preceded the Great Patriotic War, the nation's ship yards laid down 533 fighting ships (not including launches) of which 312 were in commission with a tonnage of 243,200 tons. These were 4 cruisers, 7 leaders, 30 destroyers, 18 patrol boats, 38 minesweepers, a mine-layer, 8 river monitors and 206 submarines. Over this period industry built 477 various fighting boats (patrol boats, armored boats, torpedo boats, submarine chasers, minesweepers and others). Unbuilt by the start of the war were 219 ships including 3 battleships, 10 cruisers, 45 destroyers and 91 submarines.¹³

The ships built in the prewar years represented a focus of the last achievements in scientific and technical thought and were the equal of the corresponding ships of foreign navies, particularly in terms of ordnance. The light cruisers such as the "Kirov," "Voroshilov," "M. Gor'kiy" and others which were commissioned before the war, being armed with nine 180-mm guns, in terms of artillery fire (the weight of the shell and the range of fire) had no equal. Among the finest ships in all the fleets of the world stood our destroyers of the "Gnevnyy" class, the small, medium and large submarines and so forth. The Great Patriotic War was a severe testing for the quality of the ships built as well as for the correctness of the technical ideas and solutions employed in them. As a whole, they withstood this testing successfully, in becoming a mighty combat force.

At the same time, the war disclosed individual shortcomings in the prewar shipbuilding. Combat operations showed that the Soviet Navy had an insufficient number of minesweepers and auxiliary vessels. The fleet did not include a single specially built landing craft. Antiaircraft weapons were also poor. Certain classes of ships possessed poor seaworthiness and stability. The questions of demagnetizing the ships were not completely resolved. The problem of combating the danger of mines and the defense of the ships was successfully solved with the involvement of our nation's prominent scientists such as I. V. Kurchatov, A. P. Aleksandrov and others.

The Great Patriotic War was a special heroic page in the chronicle of naval shipbuilding. The scientists, shipbuilders and sailors were confronted with onerous tasks, including: replenishing the losses of the fighting fleet,

repairing the ships which had sustained combat damage, eliminating shortcomings in the prewar designs, improving the ordnance and equipment, the immediate creation of various ships and auxiliary facilities dictated by the needs of the front, and completion of the ships laid down before the war. All of this had to be carried out under extremely difficult conditions. A number of yards were evacuated to the interior of the nation and it took time for them to commence operating. Because of the blockade, the operation of the Leningrad shipbuilding yards was curtailed. Regardless of all the difficulties, during the Great Patriotic War the fleet received from industry 2 light cruisers, 19 destroyers, 38 minesweepers, 54 submarines and around 900 various boats.¹⁴ Major emergency reconstruction and routine repairs were carried out on many combat ships, auxiliary vessels and launches. "Due to the heroic labor of the Soviet people, the fleets ended the war stronger than when they entered it, they were sufficiently battleworthy and to no degree lost the dominant position in their theaters."¹⁵

The fleet ultimately carried out its duty to the motherland and made a substantial contribution to the common cause of defeating Nazi Germany and imperialist Japan.

After the war, a tense military-political situation developed in the world. The U.S. imperialist forces which had a monopoly of atomic weapons claimed world domination. They initiated a "cold war" against the USSR, they proclaimed a doctrine of the "roll-back of communism," they formed the aggressive NATO bloc, they decided to surround the USSR and the nations of the socialist commonwealth with a ring of military bases and staging areas and initiated an unrestrained arms race, pushing the world to a new military catastrophe.

In taking measures to increase the nation's defense capability, the party set the task of the accelerated development and renewing the ships and creating a strong Navy. These party ideas were specifically embodied in the construction of our fleet during the first postwar decade. They envisaged the creation of new ships and the completion of the ships laid down before the war and in mothballs. The first postwar decade was characterized by a desire to critically assess the extensive material which armed combat at sea had provided in the course of the Great Patriotic War and World War II as a whole as well as fully utilize the increased level of science and technology in new shipbuilding. During this period, the tactical and technical performance of the surface vessels, their maneuvering and seaworthy qualities were significantly improved. Naval artillery became better, new naval antiaircraft units appeared with an improvement also in torpedo and ASW weapons, fire control equipment, radio technical [radar] equipment, communications and navigation equipment.

As for submarines, their improvement was carried out by increasing the diving depth and underwater speed, introducing equipment for submerged diesel operation (RDP), increasing the range and stayability and providing new sonar equipment and radars. Intensive work was done to develop a single engine capable of powering a submarine in a surface and submerged situation. All of this taken together ensured the construction of ships on a high technical level.

The appearance of nuclear missile weapons opened up a new stage in the development of weaponry. The introduction of technical innovations in the area of

shipbuilding fundamentally altered the combat capabilities of the Soviet Navy. The ships equipped with nuclear missile weapons, nuclear propulsion plants, radio electronic equipment, vertical take-off aircraft (initially helicopters and later vertical take-off and landing aircraft), as well as light highly-efficient power units came to represent a mighty combat force.

The new stage in Soviet naval shipbuilding was marked by the development of nuclear and nuclear-missile ocean-going ships. The missile surface forces of our fleet were represented by missile cruisers, specially built ships and boats the chief weapons of which were various types of missiles. Nuclear submarines armed with missiles and torpedos were designed and built.

The development of the first nuclear-powered ships served as a sound foundation for subsequently selecting the ways in building various types of vessels. This fundamentally transformed the material and technical base of the Soviet Navy. By the middle of the 1960's, it had basically become ocean-going and developing in the direction of balancing the forces in terms of groups, types, classes and subclasses of ships with the predominant development of various types of nuclear submarines.

During the second stage, various ASW vessels were designed and built, including those with gas turbine units and the introduction of deck-launched aircraft on the ships was started. At the same time, the first ASW helicopter cruiser was designed and this had no analogue either in our nation or abroad. Construction was resumed of landing ships and research was carried out in the area of developing hydrofoil and air-cushion vessels.

Soviet military shipbuilders carried out a continuous search for their own ways of ship development, but here a careful study and consideration were made of the areas and particular features of developing sea-going nuclear-missile forces in the imperialist states.

The strict scientific and engineer approach to the designing and construction made it possible to develop ships which in scientific and technical terms were on a par of the leading maritime states. In developing them, many original solutions were found inherent only to our shipbuilding. In particular, full consideration was given to the possibility of increasing the fleet's strike potential by arming the surface vessels with antiship missile complexes and this determined the uniqueness of the national path in our fleets development. As a result, our nation in a short historical time obtained an ocean-going fleet with great assault might capable of countering the fleets of any aggressor in any situation.

Subsequently, the development of our fleet has been characterized by a process of the constant generation-by-generation modernization of the ships. Modern nuclear missile-carrying submarines were developed and high-speed multipurpose nuclear submarines were commissioned.

The extensive construction of submarines ensured the creation of the sea-going strategic forces of the Soviet Navy. The problem of introducing deck-launched group-based vertical take-off and landing aircraft on surface ships was solved and large aircraft carriers were developed. Surface ships were built with

nuclear propulsion as well as ships with dynamic support principles on hydrofoils and an air cushion. The fleet received modern landing ships and minesweepers. The long cruises of our ships were also an important factor determining technical policy in the Soviet Navy's development.

The problem was successfully solved of developing a maneuverable fleet rear capable of supporting the operations of ship forces and the extended cruising of ships in regions of the world ocean remote from shore bases.

The creation of a modern Navy changed the situation on the expanses of the seas and oceans and put an end to the unchallenged domination of the imperialist forces in the world ocean.

The complexity of the modern international situation necessitates the greatest possible strengthening of our state's defense potential and greater readiness on the part of the Armed Forces to rebuff the forces of imperialist aggression. Imperialism has not abandoned its old dream of destroying the Soviet Union, the main bulwark of peace and socialism. The United States is pushing the world toward a new military catastrophe. It has unleashed an unprecedented arms race, it is replenishing its arsenals with nuclear, missile, neutron and chemical weapons, and is siding ever-closer in carrying out aggressive plans with the Chinese hegemonists. The United States is rapidly implementing programs for a quantitative and qualitative increase in naval forces. All of this is the embodiment of the general plan of achieving military superiority over our nation and imposing conditions on it from a position of strength. But the Soviet Union will never permit this. "We have not sought and do not seek military superiority over any party," said the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev at the 26th CPSU Congress. "This is not our policy. But neither will we permit such superiority to be created over us. Such attempts as well as talks with us from a position of strength are absolutely hopeless!"¹⁶

The Soviet Union, in possessing mighty economic and scientific-technical potential, is capable in a short period of time of developing any type of weapons on which the enemies of peace and socialism might place their hopes.

FOOTNOTES

- 1 I. I. Yakovlev, "Korabli i verfi" [Ships and Yards], Leningrad, Sudostroyeniye, 1970, p 282.
- 2 "KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh i resheniyakh s"yezdov, konferentsiy i plenumov TsK" [The CPSU in Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums], Vol 2, Moscow, Politizdat, 1970, p 265.
- 3 M. V. Frunze, "Izbrannyye proizvedeniya" [Selected Works], Voenizdat, 1977, p 370.
- 4 KRASNYY BALTIIYSKIY FLOT, 9 June 1939.
- 5 S. G. Gorshkov, "Morskaya moshch' gosudarstva" [Sea Power of a State], 2nd Edition, Supplemented, Voenizdat, 1979, p 194.

- 6 SUDOSTROYENIYE, No 2, 1972, p 65.
- 7 TsGA VMF [Central State Archives of the Navy], folio R-1483, inv. 1s, file 30, sheets 1-2.
- 8 "Sbornik prikazov RVS SSSR za 1923 g." [Compendium of Orders of the USSR Revolutionary-Military Council for 1923].
- 9 Ibid.
- 10 SUDOSTROYENIYE, No 2, 1972, p 67.
- 11 A. V. Basov, "Flot v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne 1941-1945" [The Navy in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945], Moscow, Nauka, 1980, p 29.
- 12 "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945" [The History of World War II of 1939-1945], Vol 3, Voenizdat, 1974, p 386.
- 13 "Boevoy put' Sovetskogo Voenno-Morskogo Flota" [The Campaign Record of the Soviet Navy], Voenizdat, 1974, p 143; SUDOSTROYENIYE, No 11, 1977, p 90.
- 14 "Sovetskaya Voennoy Entsiklopediya" [Soviet Military Encyclopedia], Vol 4, Voenizdat, 1977, p 346.
- 15 S. G. Gorshkov, op. cit., p 215.
- 16 "Materialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 26th CPSU Congress], Moscow, Politizdat, 1981, p 22.

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WARTIME EXPERIENCE IN REPAIR OF ARMORED MATERIEL

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[Article published under the heading "Scientific Reports and Information" by Docent and Candidate of Military Sciences, Engr-Col (Ret) V. Syropyatov: "Methods of Complete Repair of Armored Equipment"]

[Text] Comprehensive repair of equipment and weapons is made up of a number of organizational and technical measures carried out by the repair subunits and units in an established area and in a definite sequence on weapons and equipment in the aim of restoring their lost combat properties. It presupposes a delimitation of functions between the repair subunits and units in terms of the scope and range of work, the availability of repair equipment for the materiel, the weapons and special equipment (artillery, engineer and communications) and is done basically by a unit method.

Since the combat equipment (both on a track and wheeled base) is equipped with various weapons and special equipment, it is essential that the repairs involve specialists from various areas and even different repair subunits and units. Thus, for carrying out comprehensive repair on armored equipment, it is essential to have narrowly specialized repair subunits and units which could repair tanks, SAU [self-propelled artillery mount], their weapons and special equipment.

Repair on armored equipment and weapons during the years of the Great Patriotic War was carried out within a unified system which brought together the repair facilities of all levels. Here the TOE of the field forces, formations and units provided an opportunity for comprehensive repair on equipment in the course of combat operations. **Thus, in a tank battalion from the autumn of 1943 and in a separate SAU battalion from 1944, the TOE had, respectively, technical support and transport repair platoons.** In addition to the assembly and disassembly subunits which repaired the tracked and wheeled vehicles, each of them had weapon repair shops and squads. A transport repair platoon also had a radio expert. **A technical support company of the tank and mechanized brigades, in addition to a platoon for the repair of combat and wheeled vehicles, included a weapons repair squad (6-7 men).**¹ In combat these subunits carried out routine comprehensive repair by the bay method² on equipment where they had broken down or at the brigade collecting points for damaged motor

vehicles (SPAM). The scope of repair was determined each time proceeding from the tactical situation and the combat tasks to be carried out by the units. The work was directed by the deputy commanders for technical affairs.

In the tank corps formed in 1942 there were two mobile repair bases (PRB): for the repair of armored equipment as well as vehicles based on this and for the repair of motor vehicles. In June 1944, the TOE of the tank corps included an artillery shop for weapons repair (ARM). **In a mechanized corps according to the TOE there was to be a separate repair-reconstruction battalion (orvb) and an ARM.** The corps did not have units for repairing communications equipment and engineer equipment.

After the reorganization of repair facilities carried out in December 1944, the tank and mechanized corps received standardized repair units: mobile motor repair bases (PARB) and tank repair bases (PTRB) and ARM. The mobile repair bases were deployed in the course of combat operations at the SPAM the mobile tank repair base behind the battle formations of the brigades and the mobile motor vehicle repair base in the disposition of the rears while the artillery repair base was close to the corps artillery dump.

Each of the repair bases could carry out partial comprehensive repairs, using only the TOE subunits for the repair of weapons and special equipment. Specialized repair on armored equipment was carried out where it had broken down while comprehensive repair was carried out at the SPAM using the bay method. The length of the work was 1 or 2 days. The work of the mobile bases on the formation scale was directed by the deputy corps commander for technical affairs while the ARM was directed by the chief of artillery supply.

The combined-arms armies usually had: one or two PTRB, a recovery company and a SPAM for the recovery and repair of armored equipment; an ARVB [motor vehicle repair-recovery battalion] or a PARB for the repair of motor vehicles; three army artillery repair shops (AARM) and one army tractor repair shop (TARM) for the repair of weapons and tractors. One of the AARM was ordinarily deployed at the army artillery dump. For the repair of communications at the communications dump there was a repair shop which was under the army signals chief.

Experience showed that the repair and recovery equipment existing in the combined-arms armies was not always effectively utilized for repairing armored equipment. For this reason, in 1944, by a decision of the front military councils, these were put under the commander of the armored and mechanized troops (BT i MV) of the fronts. Depending upon the tasks to be carried out by the army, its place in the operational configuration of the front's troops and the availability of armored equipment, for the period of the operation it was given a varying amount of repair and recovery equipment which sometimes was put into army repair-recovery groups (REG). A group included one or two repair units, an army recovery company and a recovery detachment, SPAM and mobile detachments from the armored equipment dump (the 5th and 11th Guards Armies in the Belorussian Operation). This made it possible to concentrate the equipment for repairing armored equipment, its weapons and special equipment and to organize comprehensive medium repair and sometimes major overhauls. The recovery companies which existed in the group provided an opportunity to maximally concentrate the vehicles to be repaired. The overall leadership over all the repair

and recovery units was provided by a single center and this produced positive results.

The tank armies as repair equipment had the following: a separate tank repair battalion (otrb), one or two recovery companies and one or two SPAM, an army or separate repair-recovery battalion (arvb or orvb) and two AARM for the repair of artillery, mortar and firearm weapons. Repair-recovery groups were sometimes set up from the TOE repair facilities in the tank armies, as in the combined-arms ones. For example, in the 1st Guards Tank Army the REG were organized in the Belgorod-Kharkov (1943) and Zhitomir-Berdichev (1944) Operations.³ In a majority of instances, the repair units of the tank armies organized comprehensive or specialized routine or medium repair on armored equipment in the course of an operation in two groupings at the forward (head) and rear SPAM. The army repair-recovery battalions carried out specialized repairs on motor vehicles and vehicle-based equipment at the motor vehicle SPAM of the armies.

In individual instances, in preparing for an operation, the repair facilities of the units, formations and the army carried out comprehensive repair on the equipment according to a uniform plan under the leadership and supervision of the army Directorate for Armor Supply and Repair. For example, this was the case in the 1st and 2nd Guards Tank Armies prior to the Berlin Operation.⁴ But sometimes even the facilities of the front and the center were involved in carrying out these tasks. Thus, the organization of comprehensive repair on the tanks and SAU under field conditions involving the repair facilities of the front and center occurred in the 5th Guards Tank Army prior to the East Prussian Operation.

Having completed the regrouping, the army by 27 December 1944, was concentrated in the area of Bransk, Siemien and Dolubowo and had received the task of rebuilding the materiel in the shortest period of time. By this time, of the existing tanks and SAU in the army, 171⁵ required medium repair and major overhaul. The front assigned the army the 20th, 26th and 132nd otrb, while the Main Directorate for Technical Repair of the Red Army sent a brigade of highly skilled specialists from the plant directly to the army's disposition. Thus, considering the TOE equipment, the army had four otrb, two PTRB and two recovery companies which carried out repairs on the tanks and SAU at six SPAM organized in the units and formations. The directorate for armored supply and repair drew up a plan for the repairing of the equipment by the repair units and provided leadership and constant supervision over the course of repairs. As a result, in a short period of time (from 27 December 1944 through 13 January 1945) it was possible to carry out medium repairs and major overhauls on 160 tanks and SAU.⁶ This was the first time in the course of the Great Patriotic War that major overhauls on tanks had been carried out on such a level under field conditions and so quickly.

The concentration of a large number of repair and recovery units contributed to the organization of comprehensive repairs on the tanks and SAU and to cooperation between the repair units. It also ensured clear control and constant supervision over the quality and course of repairs. The concentration of the repair and evacuation equipment of the tank armies and the centralized control of their work on an army level also occurred in other operations.

Thus, in accord with the order of the BT i MV commander of the First Belorussian Front, the repair facilities of the units in the course of the Vistula-Oder Operation were not to be more than 10 km behind the battle formations, the corps PTRB were to be no more than 20 km behind and the army ones 30 km. The damaged tanks and SAU which were over 30 km from the operational units were to be turned over to the front's repair bases or the SPAM.

The repair facilities of the units and the PTRB of the corps in the 1st Guards Tank Army, in carrying out the order of the front, during the first 4 days of the offensive continuously moved up behind the troop battle formations. Here they did not carry out repairs on damaged vehicles due to the rapid pace of advance. Because of this in the army rear a large number of vehicles requiring repairs was formed. By a decision of the army deputy commander for technical affairs, the corps PTRB from 18 January 1945 were temporarily put under the Army Directorate of Armored Supply and Repair and their work was organized at the army SPAM where the recovery companies concentrated all equipment to be repaired. Such a concentration of the army repair and recovery units made it possible to organize comprehensive repairs on the armored equipment using the available TOE equipment and prior to 4 February to carry out over 120 tank repairs,⁷ and more than 100 repairs of armored vehicles and armored personnel carriers with an average work length on the spot of 3-6 days.

In the fronts for comprehensive repair of armored equipment, the TOE repair and recovery equipment was formed up in repair-recovery groups (Kalinin, Steppe and Second Ukrainian Front) or repair centers (the Third Belorussian, First Baltic, Transbaykal and First Far Eastern Fronts).

The front repair-recovery groups included, as in the armies, one or two repair units, a recovery platoon or company, and a mobile detachment of the armored equipment dump. These were given the task of carrying out medium repair or major overhaul on armored equipment in the zone of the advancing field forces (formations).

In the Belorussian Operation, the Third Belorussian Front broke through the enemy defenses, as is known, in two separate sectors. Repair centers were created for comprehensive repairs of armored equipment on each of the sectors. These were headed by officers from the tank repair and recovery department of the front's BT i MV commander. The repair center included orvb and PRB, a recovery company or detachment, a tank disassembly detachment, one or two SPAM and a mobile detachment for armored equipment.⁸

Particularly urgent was the question of repairing the tank artillery systems. The repair facilities of a front did not include units to repair the tank artillery systems. But a study of combat damage indicated that of all the damaged tanks and SAU the number of failing artillery systems averaged from 21 to 32 percent, that is, almost one-third.⁹ The centralized supply of artillery systems did not satisfy the demand of the repair units. In the Third Belorussian Front for the first time under field conditions an experiment was run to utilize cannons from burned out tanks. The testing provided positive results. Test firing showed that no mechanical changes had occurred in the cannon barrels of burned out tanks. Considering this, for repairing the artillery systems, under the armored equipment dump of a front, a 30-man 105th artillery shop was

organized to repair the tank weapons.¹⁰ The problem of supplying tank artillery systems in the front was solved.

There was an analogous situation in the comprehensive repair of armored equipment in the First Baltic Front in the course of the Riga and Memel Operations. This was organized, respectively, in two and three front repair centers.

For the repair of weapons and tractors, in 1944-1945 the fronts had one or two mobile railroad artillery shops (PAM), an orvb for the repair of tractors, two or three mobile tractor repair bases (PTRB) and one or two army tractor repair shops. The stationary tractor repair plants under central authority established affiliates for servicing the troops directly on the front. In addition to tractors, they repaired motor vehicles, artillery systems and sights. All repair facilities rebuilt the weapons and equipment under the leadership of the artillery supply chief in the rears and at the weapons dumps of the front.

A front also had at its disposal analogous repair facilities for motor vehicles and motor vehicle-based equipment as well as affiliates of the stationary motor vehicle plants which carried out only specialized repairs on the equipment under the leadership of the front's chief of the motor vehicle directorate.

The experience of 1943-1945 showed that the use of the repair and recovery equipment as part of the repair centers for comprehensive repair of armored equipment was more effective. This made it possible to provide direct leadership of the repair facilities, to carry out the recovery of the vehicles primarily for the interests of repairs, to establish a procedure and observe priority in repairing the various makes and types of vehicles, to carry out repairs, as a rule, on equipment which had been concentrated for repairs, to rationally allocate the available stocks of armored equipment and materials and, finally, to provide cooperation as well as constant supervision over repair quality and the work of the repair and recovery units.

On the basis of the experience of organizing and operating the centers for comprehensive armored equipment repair, in the Western Theater of Military Operations, the main tank repair directorate of the Red Army BT i MV in the Manchurian Operation planned for the creation of strong armored repair-recovery centers (BTREts) on all three fronts. For this on the eve of the operation several-score repair and recovery units were to be shifted to the Far East from the Western fronts.

Each BTREts included a mobile tank repair plant (PTRZ), a mobile tank equipment repair plant (PTARZ), a stationary armor repair plant (BTRZ) as well as strong recovery equipment in the form of recovery and recovery-transport battalions.

The strongest BTREts was organized in the First Far Eastern Front. It included a PTRZ, BTRZ, PTARZ, an armored repair train (BTRP), two otrb, recovery and recovery-transport battalions, a field assembly-distribution point and a flight of PO-2 aircraft. Since a portion of the repair and recovery units was late in arriving from the Western fronts by the start of the operation, a less strong BTREts was organized on the Transbaykal Front. On the Second Far Eastern Front, virtually no BTREts was set up for the same reasons.

The brief operation of the BTRETs in the course of the Manchurian Operation showed that the managing of a large number of organic repair units required a well-organized staff and the corresponding communications equipment.

In the course of the Great Patriotic War there were no examples of the concentrating of repair equipment from the various branches of troops under a single command or in one region for carrying out comprehensive repairs on all types of equipment and weapons of the ground forces on an operational level.

The temporary concentration of repair and recovery equipment from one branch of troops within a front and army provided a significant effect. The productivity of the repair units and the quality of repairs on the equipment increased, the supply of spare parts and units was improved, there was an opportunity to effectively manage the course of repairs as well as more effectively and purposefully carry out indoctrination and party political work among the personnel.

The concentration of repair units in one area required the concentrating of a large amount of equipment and weapons to be repaired from significant areas. Under these conditions in the formations it was essential to have more powerful recovery equipment which could provide comprehensive repair on the concentrated equipment and weapons.

The formations and field forces in the course of the war did not have TOE equipment for the repair of engineer equipment and communications. The repair of their motor transport was carried out by the TOE repair units of the corps and armies. Due to the increased amount of engineer equipment and communications and their more complex design, it was essential to have special subunits and units in the troops for their repair.

The experience of the war showed that in order to ensure the work of a large number of repair and recovery units comprising the BTRETs, it was advisable to centralize their supply of materiel on the level of the BTRETs and have the appropriate support bodies as well as the transport for this.

With the concentration of a small number of repair and recovery units at the repair centers (as was the case in the Western Theater of Military Operations), for directing their work in the course of the operations it was not necessary to organize individual control bodies. This was usually handled by one or two officers from the front's directorate of the BT i MV commander or one of the commanders of the repair units. But with stronger BTRETs, as was the case during the campaign in the Far East, it was necessary to have a unified control body (in the form of a staff) for directing the work of all the repair and recovery units comprising the center as well as the appropriate communications equipment and mobile communications.

The methods employed during the years of the previous war for repairing equipment and weapons have not lost their practical significance today. A knowledge of them provides an opportunity to seek out the most efficient methods for comprehensive repair of equipment and weapons under the complex conditions of modern combat and an operation.

FOOTNOTES

- 1 TsAMO [Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense], folio 299, inv. 3067, file 86, sheets 19-80.
- 2 The essence of the bay method for organizing repair work consists in having the entire range of disassembly and assembly work be carried out by the same specialists (brigades) at one work area.
- 3 TsAMO, folio 299, inv. 3067, file 29, sheet 55.
- 4 Ibid., file 93, sheet 85; folio 307, inv. 4163, file 85, sheet 2.
- 5 Ibid., folio 332, inv. 4948, file 315, sheet 15.
- 6 Ibid., sheet 17.
- 7 Ibid., folio 299, inv. 3067, file 93, sheets 58, 59, 61.
- 8 Ibid., folio 38, inv. 352785, file 58, sheets 6, 9.
- 9 Ibid., folio 241, inv. 2658, file 158, sheet 3.
- 10 Ibid., sheets 19-21.

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ACTIVITIES IN KIEV HIGHER NAVAL POLITICAL SCHOOL

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[Article published under the heading "Scientific Reports and Information" by Chief of the Kiev Higher Naval Political School, Vice Adm N. Kaplunov: "Military History Work in the Kiev Higher Naval Political School"]

[Text] We have set up four areas in the military history work which is carried out continuously in our school during the entire academic year. These are: a thorough study of the military-theoretical heritage of V. I. Lenin and the leading role of the Communist Party in military organizational development; the thorough assimilation of the very rich experience of the Great Patriotic War and World War II as a whole; the unmasking of the aggressive essence of imperialism, Maoism, Zionism and bourgeois falsifiers; the instilling of the habits of utilizing military history knowledge in practical activities in the officer candidates.

We have good conditions for carrying out military history work. A history museum of the political bodies and party political work in the Navy has been organized and there are colorful Navy calendars and date calendars, special-subject exhibits, studios for internal radio and TV broadcasting systems for all the training auditoriums and classrooms as well as a fundamental library.

The military-scientific, scientific-practical and military history conferences hold a significant place in military history work. A military history conference on the book by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev "Malaya zemlya" was held on a high ideological-theoretical level as well as the military-scientific and scientific-practical conferences on the subjects: "Urgent Problems in the Further Improving of Ideological-Political, Military and Moral Indoctrination of the Personnel in a Subunit of a Ship (Unit) as the Center of Political Indoctrination in Light of the Party's Present Demands," "V. I. Lenin and the CPSU on Strengthening the Indoctrinational Role of the Soviet Armed Forces. Marxism-Leninism--The Methodological Basis in the Ideological-Indoctrinational Process in the Army and Navy," "The Development of Lenin's Teachings on the Defense of the Socialist Fatherland in the Materials of the 26th CPSU Congress. Urgent Problems of Increasing Political Vigilance, Combat Readiness and Strengthening Military Order and Discipline in the School During the Present Period," and many others. All the conferences were carefully prepared for.

As a rule, theoretically well-prepared officers and admirals and prominent scientists gave reports at them.

In the school lectures and reports on military history subjects are given regularly. In the 1981-1982 academic year alone, we worked out 19 lectures and reports, including on the following subjects: "The 26th CPSU Congress on Further Strengthening National Defense Capability and the Combat Potential of the USSR Armed Forces," "Military Questions in the Materials and Decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress. Ways for Further Improving the Educational-Indoctrinational Process in the School," "Party Political Work with the Personnel of Navy Ships on a Long Cruise" and others.

The members of the officer candidate military-scientific society take an active part in military history work. In the preparations for the 26th CPSU Congress and the 9th All-Union Contest of Student Works on Social Sciences, the History of the Komsomol and the International Youth Movement, their activities assumed particularly wide scope. In the topics of the abstracts much attention was given to the problems of the 26th CPSU Congress, Lenin's teachings about the defense of the socialist fatherland and the sponsorship of the Lenin Komsomol of the Navy. A significant portion of the abstracts was devoted to the heroic history of the Russian and Soviet Navy, to an analysis of the combat experience of the Great Patriotic War and to the heroism of Soviet sailors during the war years and in peacetime. Of greatest interest were the works by the officer candidates N. Zaytsev on "Heroic Feats by the Sailors of the Twice Red Banner Baltic Fleet During the Years of the Great Patriotic War and Their Indoctrinational Significance," by A. Zubov on "Party Political Work During the Period of the Heroic Defense of the Hanko Naval Base (1941)," and by M. Kucheryavenko on "The History of the Development of Combat Traditions in the Soviet Navy." A total of 273 abstracts were presented for the competition.

The abstracts by officer candidates A. Kirkin "The Activities of V. I. Lenin in Organizing the Worker-Peasant Red Army During the Volunteer Period," A. Akatenkov "V. I. Lenin in Siberian Exile" and V. Samalychev "Leningrad and Kronshtadt--The Cities of Soviet Naval Glory" received excellent grades and were recommended for the republic round of the competition. The questions of the state of military-scientific work by the officer candidates, the improving of its quality and the involvement of the instructors from the chairs have been repeatedly discussed by the school academic council.

The officer candidates and officers have discovered much that is interesting and useful in the annual boat and yacht cruises to the sites of combat glory and to the hero cities. In recent years alone, they have visited Odessa, Sevastopol, Novorossiysk, Kerch and Brest.

Museum exhibits of both the school as well as city ones are widely employed in military history work. All the school officer candidates have visited the museum of the history of Podolskiy Rayon and have examined the exhibits at the Museum of History of the Dnepr Naval Flotilla. Particularly careful attention was given to the exhibits of the new affiliate of the Central Museum imeni V. I. Lenin, the Ukrainian State Museum of the Great Patriotic War and the materials of the exhibits "The 40th Anniversary of the Defense of the Hero City of Kiev" and "On the 1500th Anniversary of Kiev." Speaking to the officer candidates

were the veterans of the revolution, the Civil and Great Patriotic Wars F. Z. Minaylenko, V. S. Zubritskiy and A. G. Bannikov. Also memorable were their meetings with the Heroes of the Soviet Union, Maj Gen I. V. Veremeya, Capt 1st Rank N. G. Markelov, Lt Col A. K. Bolbas as well as with the political worker, Col M. I. Uvarov, Engr-Capt 1st Rank I. A. Puzanov and the military physician Capt Med Serv Z. G. Anan'yeva.

After the speeches by the veterans and an inspection of the museum's halls, the officer candidates were shown documentary training films "The Battle at Sea" and "For the Sake of Peace on Earth." Later on they themselves gave reports on the subjects "The Crucial Role of the Soviet People and Their Armed Forces in the Defeat of Nazi Germany" and "A Critique of Bourgeois Falsifiers of History and CPSU Policy" and the statements "The Contribution of the Navy to the Defeat of Nazi Germany and Militarist Japan."

The officer candidates from the company of Maj A. P. Doronin visited the republic Movie Club where there was a meeting with a creative group headed by A. A. Slyusarenko who filmed the documentary "Don't Touch Me" about the heroes of the Black Sea Fleet from the floating battery No 3. The meeting was attended by the surviving sailors. After viewing the film it was discussed by the Twice Hero of the Soviet Union Lt Gen V. S. Petrov, D. S. Sivolap and the officer candidate A. A. Kondikov. The participants in the meeting viewed the film "The Right to Fire" telling about the service of the Far Eastern Coast Guard.

The school officer candidates and officers participated in the preparation of many Ukrainian TV broadcasts and have gained skill in operating propaganda equipment. Of particular interest are the youth TV programs "Soldier Glory" and "Forward, Eagles." These propagandize the finest traditions of the Army, Navy and Border Troops. Series broadcasts alternate with reports from the site of the events.

We are proud of the fact that a film about our school "The Oceans Await Them" was shown over the Central Television in the broadcast "I Serve the Soviet Union."

Beyond any doubt, such measures leave a profound trace not only in the memory, but in the awareness of the officer candidates, as well.

The literary association "Meridians of Courage" has been operating since the school was founded. It includes incipient poets and prose writers. In the fleets the poets from our school Capt 1st Rank V. N. Zhurakovskiy, Sr Lts V. Valunskiy and V. Pavlyutkin and Lt. A. Orlov are widely known. In the creativity of the officer candidates K. Kolbyshev, V. Kondakov and other beginning poets, the main thing is the heroic-patriotic theme. The collection of poems by members of our literary association and published in 1982 was devoted to the 26th CPSU Congress, to the 40th anniversary of the start of the Great Patriotic War and to the jubilee of the Battle of Moscow.

The officer candidates, officers and members of their family, the school workers and personnel participate in the collective viewing and discussion of performances at Kiev theaters on military history and patriotic subjects. Thus, at the Ukrainian Drama Theater imeni Ivan Franko there was a discussion of the

performance of "The Death of a Squadron" by A. Korneychuk. In the Kiev Academic Theater of Russian Drama imeni Lesa Ukrainka, we were the first viewers and participants in the discussion of three premiers: "Kremlin Chimes" by N. Pogodin, "General Batutin" by L. Dmiterko and "Blue Steeds on Red Grass" by M. Shatrov.

The school Komsomol organization makes a great contribution to military-patriotic indoctrination. This is headed by the deputy chief of the political section for Komsomol affairs, Capt-Lt N. Smagin. The Komsomol members responded ardently to the decision of the Komsomol Central Committee to begin the All-Union Exploratory Expedition "A Chronicle of the Great Patriotic War." A number of meetings have been held with former combat veterans and members of the city exploratory expeditions. In December 1981, a regular meeting was devoted to the 40th anniversary of the defeat of the Nazi troops at Moscow. Assembling at the school club were participants of the historic battle, the best exploratory detachments of the Pioneer teams of the sponsored schools, students from the vocational-technical and technical schools of Podolskiy Rayon of the hero city of Kiev, the officer candidates and officers.

The school's officer candidates and officers carry out extensive work in the area of the military-patriotic indoctrination and preparation of youth for service in the Armed Forces. The school sponsors 17 schools in Podolskiy Rayon of Kiev, 2 young sailor clubs and the Cherkassk Youth Flotilla which has over 400 members. The school also provides help in preparing and holding inductee day and the military sports games "Orlenok" [Eaglet] and "Zarnitsa" [Summer Lightning] and so forth.

The school has worked out a plan of measures on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the formation of the USSR, the 40th anniversary of the Stalingrad and Kursk battles, the 40th anniversary of the liberation of Kiev and other glorious dates in the history of the Soviet Armed Forces. Military history trips have been planned to the famous Lyutezh bridgehead, to the command post of the First Ukrainian Front in Petrivtsy and to other historic sites related to the heroic defense of Kiev in 1941. Trips will also be made to the areas of fierce battles against the Nazi invaders (Korsun-Shevchenkivskiy, Zhitomir and the Carpathians).

We must particularly emphasize that the school party organization has close ties with the Kiev City and Podolskiy Rayon committees of the Ukrainian Communist Party [CPU], as well as with the party and Komsomol organizations of the enterprises and schools. Due to these fruitful ties, there have been successful solutions to many questions of military history work and a further improving in the training of highly skilled personnel for the Navy.

We feel constant support, aid and concern from the CPU Central Committee and personally from the member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and First Secretary of the CPU Central Committee, Comrade V. V. Shcherbitskiy as well as from the republic Council of Ministers.

The experience acquired by the school's collective makes it possible to say that military history work, as an important part of the entire academic process in the school, is aimed at arming the future political officers of the Navy

with Lenin's ideological heritage, the historical experience of the CPSU and a knowledge of Soviet military and naval history. It helps them master the methods of military-patriotic indoctrination of the personnel of the ships and units as well as to skillfully and soundly unmask the bourgeois falsifiers of history.

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WARSAW PACT AS SUBJECT OF HISTORICAL RESEARCH

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[Article published under the heading "Historiography and Source Study," by Col V. Semin: "The Military-Political Defensive Alliance of the Socialist Countries and the Combat Cooperation of Their Armed Forces as a Research Subject"]

[Text] Among the problems confronting Soviet military science, an important place is held by the questions related to the activities of the military-political defensive alliance of the socialist nations and by the combat cooperation of their armed forces. The pertinence of the given topic stems from the materials of the 26th CPSU Congress which approved the line of further strengthening the unity and solidarity of the fraternal countries, the greatest possible development of their cooperation and the strengthening of the military-political alliance of the Warsaw Pact states. In speaking about the Warsaw Pact, the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, in the Accountability Report emphasized that it "dependably serves the cause of peace."¹ The necessity of studying this problem is dictated by the tasks of further raising the defensive potential of the military-political alliance of the fraternal nations and the strengthening of ideological work in the armed forces.

Numerous works have been published on the military-political defensive alliance of the socialist powers and the combat cooperation of their armies. Many of them are devoted to the activities of the Warsaw Pact. The literature published in the USSR on the given question with a certain arbitrariness can be reduced to the following groups. The first includes works of a theoretical nature disclosing the problems of internationalism and strengthening the defense capability of the fraternal socialist nations in their dialectical relationship. These questions have been analyzed in a number of monographs, pamphlets, articles and dissertations. Among them we should mention the work by Ts. A. Stepanyan and V. G. Bashenov "Dialektika natsional'nogo i internatsional'nogo v zashchite mirovoy sistemy sotsializma" [Dialectics of the National and International in the Defense of the World Socialist System], Moscow, Znaniye, 1974).

The content and principles of socialist internationalism and the essence of military cooperation within the Warsaw Pact have been analyzed in the work of

V. F. Samoylenko "Osnova boyevogo soyuza. Internatsionalizm kak faktor oboronnoy moshchi sotsialisticheskogo sodruzhestva" [The Basis of a Military Alliance. Internationalism as a Factor of Defensive Might in the Socialist Commonwealth] (Voyenizdat, 1981). Of scientific-theoretical interest are the numerous articles published in military journals on the questions of the defense of world socialism.²

A number of aspects of the military cooperation of the Warsaw Pact armed forces has been taken up in dissertations and monograph research by V. A. Rodin, V. G. Bazhenov, K. V. Spirov, M. Ye. Monin, M. I. Semiryaga and others.³

The second group is made up of literature concerning the activities of the Political Consultative Committee [PCC] and the problems of coordinating the foreign policy of the Warsaw Pact states and their elaboration of a coordinated line on the urgent problems of modern times. The books bring out also the fundamental differences between the Warsaw Pact and the North Atlantic bloc (NATO) and show the aggressive, anti-Soviet essence of the military-bloc policy of imperialism. Among such works are: "Istoriya vneshney politiki SSSR" [History of USSR Foreign Policy] (Vol 2, 1945-1980, Moscow, Nauka, 1981), "Sovetskiy Soyuz i bor'ba narodov Tsentral'noy i Yugo-Vostochnoy Yevropy za svobodu i nezavisimost'. 1941-1945" [The Soviet Union and the Struggle of the Peoples of Central and Southeastern Europe for Liberty and Independence. 1941-1945] (Moscow, Nauka, 1978), "Moguchiy faktor mira i stabil'nosti v mezhdunarodnykh otnosheniyakh" [A Powerful Factor for Peace and Stability in International Relations] (Moscow, Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya, 1980), "Organizatsiya Varshavskogo Dogovora (pravovyye aspekty)" [The Warsaw Pact (Legal Aspects)] (Moscow, Nauka, 1971), "Varshavskiy Dogovor i NATO: dva kursa, dve politiki" [Warsaw Pact and NATO: Two Courses, Two Policies] (Moscow, Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya, 1979), "Voyenno-blokovaya politika imperializma" [The Military Bloc Policy of Imperialism] (Voyenizdat, 1980) and others.

In the third group is the military-political literature devoted to the coordinating of defense efforts by the Warsaw Pact states, the activities of the Joint Armed forces, the forms and methods of strengthening military cooperation among the fraternal armies and the international indoctrination of the men. These questions have been profoundly analyzed in a number of works and speeches by the member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Minister of Defense, Mar SU D. F. Ustinov as well as in the works of the USSR First Deputy Minister of Defense, the Commander-in-Chief of the Warsaw Pact Joint Armed Forces, Mar SU V. G. Kulikov and the Chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, Army Gen A. A. Yepishev.⁴

The problems of the creation and development of the alliance of fraternal nations and their armies have been analyzed particularly thoroughly in the works published on the occasion of the jubilee anniversaries of the Warsaw Pact.⁵

The collective work published in 1980 under the title "Varshavskiy Dogovor--soyuz vo imya mira i sotsializma" [The Warsaw Pact--An Alliance for the Sake of Peace and Socialism] under the general editorship of Mar SU V. G. Kulikov has most fully reflected the objective patterns in the unity of the socialist commonwealth states, the goals and nature of the Warsaw Pact, the history of the creation and development of the defensive alliance of fraternal states and its

role in the defense of socialism, peace and ensuring the security of peoples. The book shows the forms and methods of the political, economic and military cooperation of the allied nations and describes the Joint Armed forces and their control bodies.

A number of articles in "Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya" [Soviet Military Encyclopedia] are devoted to the military-political alliance of the socialist nations and to the military cooperation of their armed forces. Of interest are such materials as "The Warsaw Pact," "Military Cooperation," "Internationalism," "International Indoctrination," "International Duty" and others.

The history of the rise and campaign record of the Warsaw Pact armed forces, their structure and organization with a varying degree of thoroughness (bearing in mind chronological scope, the employed factual material and the analytical level of the publications) have been taken up in the collective works "Boevoy soyuz bratskikh armiy" [The Fighting Alliance of the Fraternal Armies], "Zarozhdeniye narodnykh armiy stran--uchastnits Varshavskogo Dogovora" [The Birth of the People's Armies of the Warsaw Pact Nations]⁶ as well as in a series of books on the Warsaw Pact armies.⁷ In these works significant room has been given to the traditions of fraternal friendship and military cooperation among the armies and they show well the international unity of the armies and their readiness to repel the aggressive intrigues of the imperialists shoulder to shoulder.

On the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the Warsaw Pact, monographic research was published by Soviet military historians and historians from Poland and the CSSR entitled "Bratstvo po oruzhiyu" [A Fraternity in Arms] and "Na vechniye vremena" [For All Times].⁸ Simultaneously these books were published in Poland and the CSSR. On the basis of extensive factual material, archival documents and memoirs, they tell how the revolutionary and military traditions of the Soviet, Polish and Czechoslovak peoples developed, and how military cooperation arose and grew stronger during the years of World War II. Great attention has been given to the friendship of the fraternal peoples in the postwar period, their collaboration in all areas of political, economic and cultural life and in defending the socialist victories.

Valuable ideas and factual data for research on military cooperation are also to be found in articles by prominent Soviet military leaders who during the war years led the fronts and armies and who had troops of allied nations under them as well as in the memoirs of Soviet marshals and generals.⁹

It is worthy of note that meetings and theoretical conferences are systematically held with the participation of the ministers of defense and their deputies, the chiefs of the main political directorates of the allied armies, the commanders and political workers, scientists and other specialists. Here the diverse experience of cooperation among the fraternal armies is generalized and important recommendations are worked out on the organizational development of the armed forces and the indoctrination of the men in a spirit of socialist patriotism and internationalism. In 1974-1980, for example, more than 10 such measures were held. Thus, at the jubilee session of the Joint Armed forces Military Council and at a military-scientific conference on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the Warsaw Pact (20-23 May 1980) there was an exchange of

opinions on the prospects for joint activities in the area of widening and deepening military cooperation, strengthening friendship between the fraternal armies and improving the Joint Armed forces. Some 16 representatives of all the allied armies participated in discussing the report by the Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Armed Forces, Mar SU V. G. Kulikov.

Urgent questions of strengthening the ideological influence on the life and training of the personnel were taken up at a conference held in June 1976 in Bulgaria and attended by the chiefs of the main political directorates of the Warsaw Pact armed forces. The ways for enriching the content, methodology and practices of international indoctrination were discussed at meetings of the leading ideological workers of the Warsaw Pact armies; these meetings were held in 1979 and 1980 in Minsk and Warsaw.

The meetings of delegations of political workers from the fraternal armies as well as the editors-in-chief of the central military press organs of the Warsaw Pact armies (1977), the chiefs of the military publishing houses (1980) and the chiefs of the military history institutes (1981) became an occasion for a thorough exchange of work experience. The results of the designated conferences and meetings made it possible to broaden the knowledge of the commanders and political workers from the armies with concrete work experience and to improve the coordination of ideological efforts in the struggle against bourgeois, revisionist and Maoist ideologies.

In the fraternal nations, a number of interesting works have been published on the military cooperation of the socialist armies. These deal with various aspects of the defensive military-political alliance.¹⁰ Written on a documentary basis, they make it possible to more profoundly understand the patriotic and international activities of the fraternal communist and worker parties in the area of strengthening the Warsaw Pact. They disclose the historical experience of this organization, the diverse activities of its political and military bodies and describe the military cooperation of the fraternal armies. They convincingly show the defensive, peace-loving nature of the Warsaw Pact and point out the harmonious reconciliation of the international and national interests of the nations comprising it. All of this is of enormous importance in the patriotic and international indoctrination of the Soviet people and the peoples of the other socialist commonwealth states, in developing high moral qualities in them and in strengthening moral potential.

At the same time, one must not pass over in silence the malicious attacks against the Warsaw Pact and against the predominant principles of socialist internationalism. These have occurred during the antisocialist intrigues of counterrevolutionary elements in Poland. In the materials published by the Polish reaction, like previously during the well-known events of 1956 in Hungary and in Czechoslovakia (1968-1969), hostile attitudes have been fanned vis-a-vis the Warsaw Pact. The principles of socialist internationalism have been subjected to special attack. Their consistent realization has been declared incompatible considering the national interests of the Polish people. All these slanderous fabrications have a definite aim of concealing the propagandizing of anti-Soviet views and fundamentally altering the foreign policy of the nation, a policy of friendship and cooperation with the USSR and the other fraternal countries. As for the representatives of bourgeois historiography, the materials published on the Warsaw Pact and the socialist nation armies are,

as a rule, tendencious. In a majority of them, the significance of the Warsaw Pact is played down in every possible way. This is done by various methods. Here they distort the actual picture of relations within the Warsaw Pact and endeavor to depict it as "an unnatural alliance," they exaggerate its difficulties encountered in the process of the development of the allied nations and their armies and so forth.

But bourgeois historiography focuses its basic efforts on several interrelated areas. First of all this is the denying of the objective need for the existence of the Warsaw Pact. Thus, A. Korbonski, an assistant professor of political sciences at the University of California, views the basic reasons for the concluding of the Warsaw Pact "in the change of the system of control over Eastern Europe by the USSR...."¹¹ The American professors T. Stanley and L. Caldwell also assert that the basic aim in creating the Warsaw Pact was to preserve "Soviet control" in Eastern Europe, to support the "local communist regimes" and ensure their "loyalty to Moscow."¹²

A second area is the distorting of the goals and nature of the Warsaw Pact and the attempts to put off on it the responsibility for those enormous military expenditures which have fallen on the shoulders of the workers in the capitalist nations. The idea of the "threat from the East" and the need to "increase the might" of NATO are the core in the research of American and Western European military specialists.¹³

The third area on which bourgeois historians concentrate their attention is the distorting of the general principles of cooperation on which the Warsaw Pact was founded. Thus, the West German author H. Berg asserts that the principles of socialist internationalism underlying the relationships of the socialist states "provide the Soviet Union with a monopoly on all the decisions taken in the Warsaw Pact."¹⁴ The book "The Soviet Soldier. Soviet Military Management on the Troop Level" published in England contains fabrications about the "interventionist policy" of the USSR vis-a-vis its allies, their purported unequal status in the Warsaw Pact and so forth.¹⁵

The Beijing hegemonists are also found among those who endeavor to distort the Warsaw Pact. Thus, on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the Warsaw Pact, the Maoists trumpeted throughout the world that the Warsaw Pact is the main instrument of a policy of aggression and war.

The documents published in the USSR and in the fraternal socialist nations from the Warsaw Pact PCC as well as the books and monographs which have come out clearly show the slanderous, provocative nature of such insinuations. Life itself repudiates these slanderous assertions. It makes it possible to draw the following obvious conclusions.

In the first place. In founding the Warsaw Pact, the socialist states were guided not by a concern for preserving the power of the "local communist regimes" which had been elected by the peoples of these nations, but rather by a consolidation of the socialist states and their need for mutual rapprochement and a close military solidarity when confronted by the aggressive NATO bloc. The Warsaw Pact is the defensive shield of socialism and socialism, in turn, comprises the basis of its strength and solidarity.

Secondly. The armed forces of the Warsaw Pact nations are carrying out a social function of historical significance. They not only ensure favorable external conditions for the construction of socialism and communism, but are also a most important guarantee for international security and a crucial factor for peace and stability. The Warsaw Pact members are consistent and decisive supporters of cooperation and collective security among the European peoples.

Thirdly. The actual relationships in the Warsaw Pact completely repudiate the thesis disseminated in the bourgeois press that this alliance violates the sovereignty of the socialist states and infringes on their national independence. An objective approach to this question indicates that the Warsaw Pact is an alliance of equals. In it there is no opposition between large and small countries and the principle of true equality has been consistently realized. Any fabrications by the enemies of socialism are powerless when confronted with this irrefutable fact.

In returning to Soviet military historiography, let us endeavor to answer the questions: What accomplishments can be noted in the area of science of interest to us, what have the military historians prepared in the third decade of the existence of the Warsaw Pact and, finally, what tasks confront the researchers in working out the problems of relationships among the socialist armies and the further strengthening of their military cooperation?

On the basis of Marxist-Leninist ideology and using the works of the founders of Marxism-Leninism and a large amount of documentary materials, the above-mentioned works examine the objective patterns of the military-political unity among the socialist states. This unity, as a sociohistorical necessity, stems from the Leninist theory of socialist revolution, the nature of the modern age and the international conditions of the existence of the USSR and the entire world socialist system. The Warsaw Pact nations have a single military-strategic goal, that is, the collective defense of the victories of socialism. The authors have analyzed the basic areas in the activities of the Warsaw Pact nations in the area of defending the socialist victories of their peoples.

In the political area, this is the consistent struggle for the creation and improving of favorable foreign policy conditions for the construction of socialism and communism; active cooperation with the other revolutionary forces of the modern times; the struggle for peace and international security and for the triumph of the Leninist principles of peaceful coexistence; the preparation of the peoples and the armies to repel aggression from wherever it may originate.

In the economic area, this, on the one hand, means a desire to broaden and deepen international economic cooperation for equal and mutually advantageous economic contacts and, on the other, the purposeful development of each of the fraternal nations and our entire commonwealth.

In the ideological area, this is coordinated offensive activities by the communist and workers parties aimed at defending, actively propagandizing and disseminating communist views and ideals and at the struggle against the slanderous fabrications of bourgeois ideologists and their supporters.

The forms of contacts and cooperation between the Warsaw Pact armies have been thoroughly depicted in the research of the military scientists from the fraternal armies. In particular, major problems of modern military theory have been successfully resolved, the subject and structure of military science have been clarified, its place has been defined in the general system of scientific knowledge dealing with war and the army, the system of its categories and methods has been analyzed and the relationships of military science with social, natural and technical sciences have been disclosed. As a result, a unity of views has been reached on the nature and methods of carrying out the tasks confronting the armed forces of the socialist commonwealth.

Substantial results have also come from the elaboration of the theoretical bases for the military cooperation of the Warsaw Pact armies. Many works have traced the ways of improving and enriching the specific principles of socialist internationalism in the daily practice of relations between the Warsaw Pact armed forces. They rightly point out that in the process of many years of Warsaw Pact activities, the principles of internationalism have become firmly established in terms of the fraternal armies. The basic content of these principles is comprised of the strengthening of the unshakable unity and fighting alliance of the socialist armed forces. The principles of collaboration and military cooperation among the Warsaw Pact armies have a secure sociopolitical, economic, ideological and military-strategic basis. At the same time, it has been pointed out that the unity and commonness of tasks among the allied armies do not exclude a certain uniqueness in military organizational development in any of the socialist Warsaw Pact nations. The specific activities in this area are determined by the concrete conditions and national features of each state.

The works by Soviet military scientists trace the basic turning points in the history of military-political cooperation among the Warsaw Pact nations and have attempted to work out a periodization for the founding and development of the military-political alliance of the socialist powers and the military cooperation among their armies. However, as yet there is not complete clarity on this question as can be seen from the differing viewpoints voiced in the literature.

All of this bespeaks a need to more thoroughly analyze the question of the periodization of the founding and development of the military-political alliance of the socialist nations and the military cooperation of their armies. Certain theoretical questions concerning the collective defense of socialism have not yet been sufficiently studied.

One of the least elaborated problems in the history of the military cooperation of the socialist nations continues to be the relationship and reciprocal influence of domestic and foreign factors during the years of the founding and strengthening of the people's democratic armies in the Central and Southeastern European nations and later in the process of socialist construction in the European socialist nations. In terms of the period of 1944-1949, the reader, we feel, has every right to expect from the specialists a further thorough analysis of such questions as the role and importance of Soviet aid in establishing the armies in the Central and Southeastern European nations as well as in the formation of a new type of relations with them.

More attention should be given to analyzing the processes presently occurring in the Warsaw Pact armies. The organizational development of the armed forces in any fraternal state introduces much that is new and specific in each nation to the general treasurehouse of experience for all the armies of the friendly socialist nations. This experience is also of interest for the Soviet Armed Forces. "Over the years of socialist construction," said Comrade L. I. Brezhnev at the 26th CPSU Congress, "the fraternal nations have acquired diverse positive experience in organizing production and management and in solving national economic problems.... Comrades, let us carefully study and more widely use the experience of the fraternal nations."¹⁶

Important changes are occurring in the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact states. The life of the fraternal armies has been characterized by a further improvement in the qualitative indicators for military and political training, by increased combat readiness and by stronger discipline and organization. Such a course outlined by the communist and workers parties in the nations of the socialist commonwealth is objectively natural.

A distinguishing feature in the life of the fraternal armies both at present and over the long run is an organic unification of the military-technical and social changes. Modern weapons and military equipment not only ensure dependable combat might of the armed forces, but also make serious changes in all areas of military affairs. All of this places high demands on the men of the allied armies, upon their ideological-political conditioning, upon the general educational and cultural level and upon the readiness to achieve high indicators in the mastery of military skill.

A distinguishing feature in the present life of the fraternal socialist armies is the fact that they are in close reciprocal, evermore integrated ties. With each passing year their military cooperation is enriched with new experience. This trend is constantly being developed, for objective needs stand behind it. It is the fruit of the consistent efforts by the communist and workers parties in the fraternal socialist countries as well as the strict observance and embodiment of the principles of socialist internationalism.

In giving a report at the Sixth All-Army Conference of Primary Party Organization Secretaries, the USSR Minister of Defense Mar SU D. F. Ustinov pointed out that cooperation of the Soviet Armed Forces with the armies of the fraternal socialist states "is permeated with a spirit of internationalism, it is based upon principles of equality, mutual respect and sovereignty and includes ever-closer coordination of development plans for the armed forces of the allied nations, the consistent carrying out of a unified military-technical policy as well as coordinated operational and other measures and the exchange of experience in troop training and indoctrination."¹⁷

One other characteristic trait in the development of relations between the fraternal armies is becoming evermore clearly apparent. The process of their ideological, spiritual and cultural integration is constantly growing broader and deeper. This is based upon the strengthening of the socialist system and socialist ideology and on increased unity of the peoples in the friendly socialist countries. This is a great spiritual victory of the fraternal socialist armies and a sound foundation for new, more advanced forms of their cooperation.

The creation of an atmosphere of trust and mutual understanding among the servicemen is a most important element in developing relations among the fraternal armies.

Here of major importance is the work done by the commanders, the political bodies, the party and youth organizations in the armies of the socialist commonwealth to indoctrinate the soldiers and officers in patriotic and international traditions, in a spirit of loyalty to the revolutionary ideas and causes for which their fathers and grandfathers fought and to develop in the men the traits of a fighter in the new socialist army who is always, without hesitation, ready to defend both his motherland as well as all the nations of the socialist commonwealth against attack by the imperialist aggressors. This work has become an organic part in the overall complex of relations between the armed forces of the fraternal socialist states and represents an object for profound research.

Under the conditions of the exacerbated ideological struggle, when the rabid anticommunism in the West has been elevated to the rank of state policy, of particular importance is a study, critique and unmasking of modern imperialist concepts on the questions of relations between the armed forces of the socialist commonwealth nations, particularly in the theoretical sphere. The pseudo-theoretical research by bourgeois ideologists is aimed at "establishing" and whitewashing the aggressive essence of NATO. The plans of the reactionary forces aimed against the Warsaw Pact are disclosed precisely in "scientific" research before they are in practical deeds. Finally, the works of many bourgeois military ideologists contain flagrant misinformation and falsification of the history of the armed forces in the socialist commonwealth nations.

A generalizing of the experience of the relationships of the Soviet Armed Forces with the socialist armies, like the diverse relations between them, a study of their quantitative development and on this basis an analysis of the present state open up a broad field of activity for researchers working on studying the military-political alliance of the socialist states. A thorough analysis of the accumulated experience contributes to a correct, scientifically sound solution to present-day and future problems of the socialist commonwealth in the military area. Here, we feel, as yet not sufficiently complete use is being made of the opportunities for pooling collective efforts by the military scientists of the socialist countries. Such a pooling of efforts, undoubtedly, will lead to new substantial results.

FOOTNOTES

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REVIEW OF BOOK ON BORDER GUARD OPERATIONS IN 1929-1938

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[Review by Candidate of Historical Sciences, Maj Gen V. Ivanov of the book "Na strazhe sovetskikh rubezhey 1929-1938" (On Guard for the Soviet Frontiers 1929-1938) by A. I. Chugunov, Voenizdat, 1981, 272 pages]

[Text] The state frontier of the Soviet nation after the victory of Great October was put under guard and defense. The necessity of such a measure was caused by the fact that international imperialism initiated a universal political, economic and ideological offensive against the socialist state, employing all available means, forms and methods.

The state frontier became a unique target which was fired against by the enemies of Soviet power, in testing the strength of the socialist system and the ability of the dictatorship of the proletariat to defend the revolutionary victories.

The years passed, our nation grew stronger and developed, socialist transformations were carried out in all areas of socioeconomic, political and cultural life of Soviet society, but there was no peace on its frontiers. On all sectors there was an acute, frequently armed struggle against provocateurs, bandits and agents of imperialist intelligence. All of this is thoroughly described in the monograph by A. I. Chugunov.

The book shows not only the general situation on the various sectors of the frontier, but also all the major border conflicts. This has made it possible for the author to encompass the sweep of occurring events, to bring out their essence, relationships, particular features and show the preparations of staging areas by the imperialists for a war against the USSR.

The situation on the frontiers with Afghanistan and Iran was the most difficult at the beginning of the 1930's. Here a fierce struggle continued against the Basmach bands who fought against the socialist changes being carried out in Soviet Central Asia. The basic bases of the Basmach bands were located in the neighboring countries of Afghanistan and Iran, but also individual areas arose in the border regions of Kirghizia, Tajikistan and particularly Turkmenia. However, at the beginning of the 1930's, this protracted struggle against the

Basmach bands ended. In the course of the combat operations, the state security bodies and the Border Troops demonstrated examples of courage and heroism.

In the 1930's, the center of attention shifted to the Far East, where the Japanese militarists, with the support of the aggressive forces from the other imperialist states, occupied Korea and Northeast China and began active preparations for war against the USSR. They concentrated their troops, stockpiled weapons and ammunition and systematically provoked incidents and armed conflicts. The Japanese carried out 169 provocations between the Khingan and Grodekovski border detachments in 1937 and 1938; of this number, 6 ended with armed clashes. Over this same period the Japanese violated the frontier 22 times and their aircraft repeatedly invaded our air space. The militarists dropped counterrevolutionary literature and made more than 60 various provocations (p 261). The book describes the numerous clashes with the armed bands of White Guards and "hunhuz" supported by Japanese intelligence.

The military-political provocations of the Japanese militarists involved both small groups of soldiers and officers as well as troop formations up to units and formations inclusively. In individual instances, for example, in the area of Lake Khasan, the border incidents grew into armed conflicts employing tanks, aviation and artillery. A. I. Chugunov has rightly pointed out that the defeat of the Japanese troops in the area of Lake Khasan was a serious blow against the aggressive plans of imperialist Japan. In this conflict the Soviet troops for the first time after the Civil War conducted combat operations against well-trained regular units of the imperialists.

The aggressive neighbor provoked conflicts and incidents not only on land, but also at sea. In benefiting from an obvious superiority in naval forces, Japanese fishermen under the cover of naval ships, systematically raided the sea riches in Soviet waters, particularly off the shores of Kamchatka. In 1933 alone, 17 Japanese factory ships, 3 crabbing ships, 8 trawlers and up to 150 small vessels were engaged in catching fish and crab in Soviet territorial waters (p 180). Japanese naval ships frequently cruised in our territorial waters coming into the 3-mile limit.

In the provocative actions at sea the Japanese military actively utilized the Kuril Islands and the southern part of Sakhalin where its large naval bases were located.

With the coming to power of Naziism in Germany, the subversive anti-Soviet activities of imperialist intelligence agents intensified greatly. Starting in 1936, on the northwestern, western and southwestern frontiers the enemies of the USSR conducted extensive intelligence activities and providing the greatest possible aid and support for various governmental organizations of the pro-Nazi stripe in the neighboring states of the USSR (p 20).

There are numerous instances of subversive acts on the frontiers of our nation committed with the direct involvement and financial support of the forces of international imperialism which directed the anti-Soviet elements in the bordering bourgeois states at complicating the situation and the relationships with the USSR.

This applies primarily to the Romanian reactionaries who acted in the interests of Nazi Germany, the fighting fist of the international aggressive forces. Nazi agents were dropped into the USSR, and bands of Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists invaded. The provocative actions on the frontier did not halt. For example in 1936, Soviet Border Troops and peaceful Soviet citizens came under fire 47 times (p 27).

As one of the forms of struggle, the enemy employed economic blockade, intending to undermine our economy. But they miscalculated and did not consider the steadfastness and stubbornness of the Soviet people who had rallied around the Leninist party which skillfully directed the revolutionary enthusiasm of the masses of people to carry out the immediate tasks of strengthening national defense capability. In January-April 1929 alone, the Border Troops engaged in armed clashes with the enemy 537 times (p 6).

The author discloses the activities of the Communist Party and the Soviet government to ensure the inviolability of our frontiers. At the same time, the book convincingly shows the peace-loving foreign policy of the USSR and its desire to resolve disputed border questions at the negotiating table and not by weapons. Our party and government support such a policy of peace and international cooperation at present when the forces of militarism and aggression in the NATO countries, in being headed by the United States, are balancing on the brink of war with the use of weapons of mass destruction.

In noting the positive aspects of the reviewed work, we must also mention its individual shortcomings. It gives little attention to the guarding of the frontiers on the Black Sea. Although on a smaller scale than in Central Asia or the Far East, here also the Border Troops guarded the frontier and apprehended violators including large smugglers and agents of imperialist intelligence. The role of the Chekists [Soviet security police] in defending the inviolability of the Soviet frontiers from 1929 through 1938 should have been more widely shown.

As a whole, the work merits a positive evaluation. The book is instructive not only for the Border Troops, but also for a broad range of readers.

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